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Abstract 
In this dissertation I take exception with a widely held 
philosophical doctrine, according to which agents are only 
blameworthy for the bad actions they have chosen to bring 
about. My argument strategy is to present cases in which agents 
are blamed for involuntary actions that are not in any way 
connected to their culpable and voluntary choices. These 
failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions of culpable 
ignorance where agents have been negligent or careless. More 
specifically, I claim that violations of natural duties of respect 
and consideration, and certain acquired role-type duties, are 
blamed ;-.ithout any voluntary consent. If my examples are 
persuasive, then the point is reached where a normative 
principle of 'voluntary consent' does not in fact coincide with 
people's actual practices and 'considered judgements'. In the 
final sections of the dissertation, I argue against the plausibility 
of keeping the principle and revising our judgements. 
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Introduction 
Choice has obvious and immediate moral significance. The fact that a 
certain action or outcome resulted from an agent's choice can make a 
crucial difference ... to our moral appraisal of that agent... (T.M. 
Scanlon, The Significance of Choice.) 
I agree-choice does have an obvious and immediate moral significance. 
However, in my opinion, its significance is often over-emphasised. Indeed, 
this inflation of the importance of choice takes the form of a widely 
supported philosophical doctrine; the thesis that an agent is only 
blameworthy for bad actions he has chosen to bring about. This is the view I 
will challenge in this dissertation. 
In Chapter I I propose that this thesis-PVC-has commanded such 
widespread approval on account of its connection with the most 
commonly recognised excusing conditions. More specifically, it has been 
deemed unfair to blame an agent for an involuntary action, for if he acted 
involuntarily, then he acted from ignorance or as a result of outside force. 
However, noting this connection only raises two more questions: (i) why 
should it be unfair to blame someone for an act done from outside force, 
or ignorance? (ii) how is it possible that ignorance does not always excuse? 
In order to answer the first question, I embark on a discussion of some 
prominent accounts of the excuses. Finally, I settle on R. Jay Wallace's 
(1998) recent theory, and invoke some of his insights to construct a 
positive argument for PVC. As will be clear throughout the entire 
dissertation, this argument rests on the premise that a voluntary act or 
choice is necessary for the violation of a moral obligation. 
In Chapter 2, I discuss the excusing condition of ignorance in some detail; 
it comes in two types : factual and moral, and is of special importance to 
my project. For when it does not excuse, so that the agent acts from 
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culpable ignorance, we apparently have an occasion where an involuntary 
action is thought to deserve blame. Therefore, acts done out of culpable 
ignorance are, at least prirna facie, in conflict with PVC. Proponents of 
PVC, however, are not unaware of this difficulty and have a standard 
response, one that involves tracing culpable ignorance back to earlier 
voluntary and culpable actions and omissions. It is important to keep in 
mind that if one subscribes to PVC, then one is committed to explaining 
involuntary culpability in terms of voluntary actions. 
One matter of complication is that ignorance of a moral rule may not 
straightforwardly render an act involuntary. Indeed, I propose that the 
possibility of moral ignorance arises only in connection with a class of 
moral rules that are not 'conceptually' related to determinate patterns of 
behaviour involving (e.g.) physical injury. To this class, I suggest, belong 
duties of respect and consideration and other 'positive duties' related to 
the idea of a role-requirement (these ideas are more fully explored in 
Chapter 3). My over-arching aim in Chapter 2 is to show how an advocate 
of voluntary consent is committed to modifying PVC in order to account 
for cases of culpable ignorance, factual, and moral, suitably understood. 
In Chapter 3 I attempt to clarify concepts integral to this project, namely 
moral responsibility, blame, and blameworthiness. I do this by briefly 
presenting and criticising a common conception of moral responsibility, 
which links blame to states of character. Drawing from the lessons learnt 
here, I present and endorse R. Jay Wallace's (1998) reactive theory of 
responsibility, which I believe, both avoids the aforementioned troubles 
with the 'vice theory' and gives a highly satisfactory and illuminating 
account. One important idea that emerges from Wallace's theory is that a 
theory of blame must keep a close connection with the concepts of right, 
wrong and moral obligation. In this context, I explain the types of 
II 
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obligations and duties which constitute the 'concept of right' (cE. Rawls 
(1972)), drawing a distinction between what I call 'negative duties', and 
positive duties' Negative duties are specific duties, roughly related to the 
bringing about of injury, while positive duties are more extended and 
relate to the notion of a role-requirement. This is the idea that by virtue of 
occupying a place in society, or moral narrowly, an office or station, one 
acquires duties correlated with that role. The idea of a positive duty (in my 
sense) is one of a temporally extended duty, of high complexity, and 
requiring a hirh level of a Care. This notion is of great importance for my 
argument in Chapter 4. 
In Chapter 4, I present my own sustained argument against PVC, showing 
that our moral judgements concerning Cases of culpable ignorance do not 
accord with the prescriptions of PVC (including the modification outlined 
in Chapter 2) . My argument strategy is simply to present cases in which 
agents are blamed-using the conception of blame from Chapter 3-for 
involuntary actions that are not in any way connected to their culpable 
and voluntary choices. These failures correspond, I suggest, to occasions 
where agents have been neglectful, negligent or careless, such that they 
have failed to fulfil certain 'positive duties'. More specifically, I claim that 
violations of natural duties of respect and consideration, and acquired 
role-type duties, are blamed without any voluntary consent. If my 
examples are persuasive, and these are indeed occasions of blame for an 
involuntary act, we reach a point where the normative principle (PVC*-a 
refined PVC) does not coincide with people's actual practices and 
'considered judgements'. In the final sections of the dissertation, I argue 
against the plausibility of keeping the principle and revising our 
1 The terms are originally Rawls' (1972), but I deploy them in a divergent manner. 
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judgements. I attempt to diagnose the temptation for PVC as a 
generalisation from a skewed sample of cases, arguing that a distinction 
must be drawn between types of moral obligations that do necessitate a 
measure of 'voluntary consent', and others which do not. This distinction 
corresponds to the difference between negative and positive duties, and is 
intuitively obvious in the disparity between the expressions, 'violate a 
duty', and 'fail to fulfil a duty'. I contend that the latter need only that the 
agent 'miss the mark', or fail to 'measure up' such that questions of 
voluntary consent are indeed quite irrelevant. I then consider the 
implications of the rejection of PVC for the excuses, and more specifically 
Wallace's arguments for PVC, ending off by trying to bring the scope of 
blame, once PVC is rejected, into proper perspective. 
In sum, this dissertation has the negative aim of showing that contrary to 
popular philosophical opinion, agents may appropriately be blamed for 
wrong that is not related to their voluntary and culpable choices. 
Understanding why this is the case, will, I hope, provide some interest. 
iv 
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1. Voluntary Action and the Excuses 
According to a doctrine that commands wide philosophical support, an 
agent is only to be held morally responsible for his voluntary actions and 
omissions. In this chapter (i) I explain what this thesis actually entails, (ii) 
suggest reasons as to why it has seemed so plausible to many philosophers, 
and (iii) construct a positive argument in support of the view. 
1.1 The Principle of Voluntary Consent 
To say that a person acted 'voluntarily' means that he really did perform 
an action and that he ended up doing what he intended to do. In this 
respect, the notion of the voluntary involves both a control and knowledge 
condition. An action or state is within a person's direct voluntary control if 
he can bring it about as a result of choosing or intending, while actions 
performed as a result of choosing or intending are voluntary only when 
the agent knew what he was doing, i.e. brought about the result that he 
had intended or foreseen. 
It is a widely held philosophical view that a person is morally 
responsible only for voluntary actions in this sense. For example, Sabini 
and Silver write: 
A central notion of our moral lives is responsibility, and responsibility 
presupposes choice; emotion is unchosen. We see emotions, desires, 
passions, and impulses as beyond the will, without control. It is unfair to 
blame people for what they cannot control (1987, p. 169). 
Michael]. Zimmerman (1988) concurs: 
... one is not free with respect to whether one is compassionate (or 
pitiless), kind or cruel, courageous (or cowardly) etc. If one is not fi·ee 
with respect to any such character trait, then one is not appraisable for 
I ' 
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it; hence one is not appraisable for any character trait. A similar 
argument applies to emotions, desires and beliefs (p. 115). 
In these passages the control aspect of 'voluntariness' is emphasised, 
formulated as the thesis that an agent cannot be fairly held responsible for 
states not within his voluntary control. However, although this tendency to 
focus on the control aspect of voluntariness is understandable-for without 
proper control, the need to 'know' what one was controlling would not 
arise- the epistemic element is no less crucial to voluntary action. The 
Oxford Companion to Philosophy puts the point as follows: 
... one essential requirement for moral responsibility [is] that the 
wrongdoer should have known what he is doing and been willing to do 
it .. . (p. 772) 
That is, an 'essential requirement' for moral responsibility is that the 
agent has acted voluntarily, where this implies knowing what he is doing. 
In this dissertation, I focus on moral responsibility for bad acts, and 
therefore on occasions when an agent is thought to deserve moral blame 
or sanction. In this regard, the view that agents' are morally responsible 
only for their voluntary acts and omissions entails that an agent is morally 
blameworthy for a bad act only if he knowingly brought about the act he 
intended. For convenience, I refer to this thesis as the Principle of 
Voluntary Consent; more formally, 
(PVC) For any bad act x, A is blameworthy for x only if A voluntarily 
consented to X. I 
1.2 The Appeal of the 'Voluntary Consent' 
Why has PVC seemed so plausible to so many philosophers? I suggest that 
the principle encapsulates the 'Kantian'- though not only Kantian-idea 
I A quick note on terminology: A is morally blameworthy for some bad act itT A is morally responsible for that 
bad ace Since I am concerned only with respons ibility for bad acts, I use the expressions morally responsible 
and blameworthy interchangeably . 
2 
Voluntary Action and the Excuses Chapter I 
that whatever moral worth an action has, derives solely from the agent's 
will in performing the action. The domain of the moral is the domain of 
the will expressed in action; it is the domain for which we are responsible' 
(Sabini and Silver, 1987, p. 165). But this means that 'external factors' 
beyond the control of the agent's will are not relevant to the moral 
evaluation of an agent. An analogous doctrine is also pervasive in legal 
responsibility, corresponding to the notion of mens rea, the requirement 
that the legal offender have a guilty state of mind. 
". the concurrence of the will when it has the choice either to do or 
avoid the act in question, [is] the only thing that renders human action 
praiseworthy or culpable' (Blackstone, cited in Hart 1962, p . 174) 
An agent's moral worthiness in action should not be determined by 
anything other than his own contribution. Furthermore, this idea is 
reflected in the existence of various kinds of 'excusing conditions', 
acknowledged as undermining an agent's moral responsibility for an 
action;2 the presence of these conditions make it unfair to blame the agent 
for what happened. Persons are only morally responsible their voluntary 
actions because an involuntary action is one done in ignorance, or as a 
result of outside force or compulsion. This connection is conceptual and 
due to Aristotle, who defines an involuntary action as one done from force 
or ignorance. 3 This suggests an obvious argument for PVC. 
2 The term 'exruse' is employed in a wide variety of contexts; it may indicate pleas as mul tifarious as (i) having 
been pushed, forced, or made a mistake; as well as (i i) being 'only a child', 'insane' or brainwashed. In this 
dissertation, I focus exclusively on the class of 'pleas' that undermine an agent's responsibility for an act, 
without challenging lhe presumption that he is anything other than a morally accountable agent; that is, those 
that do not entaillhe 'objective altitude' (Strawson, 1982). I call th is type afplca an 'excuse' and distinguish it 
from an 'exemption' (cf. Watson 1987; Wallace 1998), which functions by questioning the agent's capacity for 
responsible agency. In line with Aristotle's definition of 'involuntary actions', the excuses may be fitted into two 
general categories-(l) force and (2) ignorance, The category of exulse by 'force' includes constraint, necessity, 
duress and coercion; knowledge-type excuses include inadvertence and mistakc. 
3 See the Nicomachean Ethics 11 09b30-11 11 b5 (trans. David Ross). Aristolic distinguiShes belW"een 'nOt 
voluntary' and 'involun tary'. He thinks that bad actions brought about in ignorance are 'not volumary', and but 
only those which produce 'pain and regret' ( 1II Ob2 -II10b24) arc involuntary. Someone's reaction to a bad 
consequence is surely a mattei' for ethical appraisal but it seems to h<lve lillie to do with whether the act done 
was 'involuntary' or 'not voluntary', I therefore treat 'not voluntary' and 'involuntary' as synonymous. 
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1.3 A First Argument for PVC 
An action is voluntary when it is not involuntary. But, since an involuntary 
action is one done in ignorance, or as a result of outside force, it is 
therefore excused from blame; or more specifically, it is one which we 
regard as unfair to blame. Therefore, a voluntary action may be taken as 
an action that is not excused from blame, and one for which it is fair to 
blame the agent. In this sense we are only morally responsible for our 
voluntary acts and omissions. 
This argument is too quick for two reasons. Firstly, for although 
involuntary actions are indeed those where some excuse is present, this 
does not answer the question of why it is unfair to blame actions where one 
of these 'excusing conditions' is present. If the connection between 
involuntary action and the excuses is conceptual, then assessing PVC 
requires as answer to why we do not think it fair to blame a person for 
actions done because of 'outside force' or in ignorance. 
Secondly, it is well known that the excuses do not always get one 
completely off the hook-as Austin (1962) notes: 'the average excuse ... gets 
us only out of the frying pan into the fire' (p. 177); notable in this regard 
is the excusing condition of ignorance, which will not succeed if the 
ignorance that led to the act's being involuntary was itself culpable. But 
this opens up the possibility that an involuntary action-one done in 
ignorance-may on occasion be culpable. But what does this imply for 
PVC? PVC says that, for all (bad) actions, if A did not voluntarily consent 
to the action then A is not blameworthy. If culpable ignorance is a 
counter-example to this, then PVC is false . 
These two points prescribe the following course for our argument: 
(I) Assessing PVC requires understanding how the commonly recognised 
excuses funct ion to inhibit blame. For only once we know how the excuses 
serve to inhibit blame, will we know why it is unfair to blame an agent for 
4 
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an involuntary action; i.e. we will know why PVC is correct. I devote the 
remainder of this chapter to an investigation of the excusing conditions; 
this is to enquire as to why it would be unfair to blame an involuntary 
action. 
(2) Why do excuses sometimes succeed and sometimes not? Answering this 
presupposes an account of how the excuses work. Moreover, only if the 
reason why an excuse fails to exculpate is somehow related to the agent's 
voluntary actions will PVC be defensible, although in a modified form. 
Chapter 2 explores tLs question of 'excuses that do not excuse', more 
specifically (for reasons I explain in Chapter 2) culpable ignorance. I 
explain the strategies the adherent of PVC is committed to employing in 
order to maintain the view that the space of blame is the space of the 
voluntary. 
1.4 The Principle of Alternative Possibilities 
A first suggestion as to the functioning of excusing conditions is that 
excuses show that the agent 'could not have done otherwise'. Indeed, in 
the history of the free-will problem, most theorists-both Compatibilists 
and Incompatibilists alike-have agreed on this point: an agent is morally 
responsible for his action only if he could have done something different 
from what he did do (PAP). They have, of course, given markedly 
different accounts of what this ability to 'do otherwise' consists in 4 
But the 'inability to do otherwise' is insufficient as an account of the 
functioning of excuses for two reasons: 
l. It has nothing to do with the cognitive excuses: in this respect, we still 
need an account of why actions done in ignorance, are also thought to 
5 
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escape moral sanction. What is it about an action done in ignorance that 
makes moral blame unfair? 
2. To say that an action is excused if the agent could not have done 
otherwise is still not to say why we think it is unfair to blame him. Why 
should an agent be excused if he could not have avoided performing that 
very action? Although the principle of alterative possibilities (PAP) does 
present itself as a natural generalisation from various cases involving (e.g.) 
compulsions, post-hypnotic suggestions, and coercion, an explanation is 
still needed as to why the inability to do otherwise should always serve to 
undermine the appropriateness of moral blame. 
In recent decades, the principle of alternative possibilities has come under 
attack on exactly this point. Harry Frankfurt has developed a style of 
counterexample to PAP in which an agent is unable to do other than he 
did do (unable to avoid the action), but who nonetheless appears to be 
morally responsible. 5 Frankfurt's core insight is that the inability of the 
agent to otherwise is not what grounds our judgement to the eflect that he 
is or is not responsible, and thus that an inability do otherwise does not in 
and of itself excuse an agent from moral responsibility . According to 
Frankfurt, the agent's own higher order attitude to the motivations that 
move him to action is crucial in accounting for our willingness to judge 
him morally blameworthy. 
Although there is some controversy as to the implications and success of 
Frankfurt style counter-examples with respect to determinism,6 it seems 
clear that Frankfurt has shown that the inability to do otherwise is not in 
4 For a classic Compatibilisl analys is, see David Hume's An Etlqlliry Cnnurlling Hwnan UnderslaJldillg: also C.E. 
Moore's ELhicJ. For an lncompatibilisl response to Hume. see Thomas Reid's Essays em lhe Active POll'trJ of Man. 
5 The original argumen t is presented in Frankfurt (1969). 
6 Perhaps an agent need not have the ability to 'do otherwise' to be responsible, bu t needs to be the 'ultimate 
originator' or all his stales; and determin ism rules out this pOSSibility. 
6 
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and of itself sufficient to excuse an agent from responsibility. This means 
that although the inability to do otherwise might be what unites control-
type excuses, it is not what actually does the work in undermining the 
appropriateness of blame. In sum, even if PAP is correct as a 
generalisation from the control-type excuses, it remains silent on the 
question of why this general feature is thought to undermine blame. 
1.5 The Influenceability Theory 
Traditional 'Utilitarian' accounts of moral responsibility have a standard 
answer as to why excuses inhibit blame. The strategy is well known: it is to 
point out that holding people morally responsible serves important 
deterrent and therapeutic functions, and then to note that when excusing 
conditions apply, the rationale for blaming or punishing is undermined. 
For when an agent acts from ignorance or as a result of (e.g.) coercion, he 
will typically not have displayed any bad motivation to begin with; there is 
therefore no reason to try to improve his motivations and blame loses its 
point. Compare this passage from Morris Schlick (1962): 
When a man is forced by threats to commit certain acts we do not blame 
him, but the one who held the pistol at his breast. The reason is clear: 
the act would have been prevented had we been able to restrain the 
person who threatened him; and this person is the one whom we must 
influence in order to prevent similar acts in the future (p. 54). 
The 'influenceability theory' does then offer an account of why we are 
morally responsible only for our voluntary acts and omissions. For when 
an act is involuntary-(e .g.) coerced or ignorant-it will not reflect any 
defect in the agent's volitional system, and since the point of moral blame 
is essentially to influence behaviour, this eliminates the rationale for 
moral sanction. 
The influenceability theory has been subject to much criticism over the 
years; it will not be necessary to repeat all of these here. However, one 
7 
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point of dissatisfaction bears directly on the question that we are now 
concerned (why do excuses render blame unfair?): an emphasis on 
forward-looking questions of utility, distorts the practice of blame. 
JustifYing PVC requires saying why it would be unfair to blame the agent 
for an involuntary act, but the influenceability theory does seem to even 
address this issue. It tells us that blame loses its point when the excuses 
apply, but why does this make it unfair to blame someone for an 
involuntary action? This makes it very vulnerable to the well rehearsed 
criticism that it gives us no reason to sanction only the guilty. In sum, by 
over-emphasising the utility benefits of blame, the influenceability theory 
does not provide an answer as to why it would be unfair to blame an 
involuntary action. 
In the next section, I discuss P.F. Strawson's reactive theory of moral 
responsibility, which gives a substantially improved account of the excuses. 
1.6 The Quality of Will Theory 
In Freedom and Resentment, P.F. Strawson (1982) notes that the 
influenceability theory, with its emphasis on social regulation, is greatly 
out offocus as a description of our actual practices: 
The picture painted by [influenceability theorists] is painted in a style 
appropriate to a situation envisaged as wholly dominated by objectivity 
of attitude. The only operative notions invoked in this picture are such 
as those of policy, treatment, control. But thorough-going objectivity of 
attitude, excluding as it does the moral reactive attitudes, excludes at 
the same time essential elements in the concepts of moral 
condemnation and moral responsibility (1982, p. 62). 
He seeks to correct this deficiency in the influenceability theory by 
shifting emphasis onto the reactive attitudes- the ways in which they are 
modified, and withdrawn-in our practices as participant members of a 
moral community. We place a great importance on the attitudes, feelings 
and intentions of others as expressed in their actions and demand that 
8 
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they treat us with a measure of good will (Strawson 1982, pp. 63, 65). The 
reactive attitudes are bound up with the demands we hold people to, 
being responses to the degree this demand for good will has been met or 
flouted . 
On Strawson's analysis, excuses share the feature of showing that the 
person did not violate the demand for good will. They therefore inhibit 
the reactive attitudes because these attitudes are responses to violations of 
the demand. This may happen in two different ways. Firstly, the excuse 
may altogether sever the connection between 'what happened' and the 
agent, as when someone '-.nocked you over because she herself tripped, or 
suffered from an epileptic seizure. Body movements may in these sorts of 
cases not reflect any quality of will at all. In the second case, excuses show 
that quality of will displayed by the agent did not, after all, violate the 
demand for goodwill. For if someone knocked you down because she 
(falsely) believed that you were in danger, then although her action does 
express a particular quality of will, it is not one that merits your 
resentment. Strawson's analysis elegantly unifies both cognitive and 
control type excuses: both sorts demonstrate that the agent did not-
appearances to the contrary-violate the demand for good will or proper 
regard. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to consider Strawson's insight in more 
detail, since it will be very important in later argument. Strawson contends 
that excuses 'invite us to see the injury as one in respect of which a 
particular one of these [reactive] attitudes is inappropriate' (1974, p. 65) 
by showing that the person did not really violate any moral demand. The 
idea is then that moral demands regulate quite different states from other 
types of rules such as traffic or linguistic rules, both of which regulate 
performances. (I may violate and be accountable to traffic laws even when I 
9 
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quite obliviously exceed the designated speed limit. 7) Moral demands or 
requirements however, regulate not states of affairs per se but qualities of 
will. Therefore, since moral demands pertain to adequate regard or good 
will, questions of whether someone has violated or complied with a 
demand are to be decided not by looking at what happened, but at the 
quality of the agent's will. In summary, excuses function by inhibiting the 
reactive attitudes because these are precisely responses to occasions where 
the demand for good will has been violated. One might say that on 
Strawson's analysis, excuses defeat the presumption of ill will . 
However, it should be clear that Strawson's account, in its present 
formulation, does not actually support the Principle of Voluntary Consent. 
For the reactive attitudes are linked to the demand for good will, but 
there would seem to be nothing in the concept of 'good will' that entails 
that only an agent could violate the demand only through a voluntary 
action. For example, someone might violate the demand by displaying 
indifference, or failing to reciprocate love, or being negligent or careless, 
where these could not plausibly be thought to be things that we choose to 
do. What is important is simply whether or not the agent displayed an 
attitude that was expressive of ill will. Consequently, nothing in Strawson's 
account rules out the possibility of an unintentional violation of a moral 
demand. 
However, according to R. Jay Wallace (1998), the basic deficiency in 
Strawson's account is exactly this point: Strawson does not properly 
delineate the 'qualities of will' that are relevant to moral responsibility (1998, 
p. 126). Wallace contends that Strawson's understanding of 'quality of will' 
as including 'attitudes of goodwill, affection or esteem on the one hand or 
contempt, indifference or malevolence on the other' (Strawson 1974, p . 
63) is too broad. Many of these attitudes are not at all relevant to 
7 These are strict liability offences. For a discussion see Hart (19G8). 
10 
Voluntary Action and the Excuses Chapter I 
ascriptions of moral responsibility (Wallace 1998, pp. 126): although we 
can agree that it matters greatly to us as persons how others view us, and 
whether they treat us with affection or indifference, it is, at best, doubtful 
that one should be blamed for being indifferent or for failing to love 
someone. Accordingly Wallace claims that 'qualities of will' should be 
interpreted to correspond with occasions of specifically moral responsibility 
(1998, p. 126-127). In the next section I explain how Wallace does this. 
1.7.1 Wallace's Theory of Excuses 
Wallace begins his account of the excuses by drawing upon J.L. Austin's 
suggestion that excuses function by showing that although what occurred 
would normally be morally wrong, the agent did not really perform the 
action intentionally.B However, as Wallace himself indicates, this is merely 
to restate PVC (1998, P 124).9 For we need to know why excuses inhibit 
blame for x, by showing that the agent did not intentionally do x. To this 
end, Wallace appropriates Strawson's idea that excuses show that the 
agent did not really violate the moral demand for good will, and therefore 
has not done anything wrong. But if the agent has not done anything 
wrong, then by a 'fundamental principle of desert'-'no blameworthiness 
without fault' (Wallace 1998, p. 135 )-then it would be unfair to blame 
him. Let us spell out the argument in full. 
For any bad act x and excusing condition y: 
(1) If an excusing condition (y) is present then A did not do x 
intentionally (Austin). 
8 Excuses are to be distinguished from justifications, which grant tha t the agent intentionally performed the 
action in questio n but attempt to show that it was not really wrong. or was permissible, either in general. or in 
the circumstances (Austin 1970, p. 176). 
9 A intentionally does xjusl in case A voluntarily does x. 
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(2) If A did not do x intentionally, then A did not violate a moral 
demand in x-ing (Strawson's suggestion). 
(3) If A did not violate a moral demand in (x-ing) then A did not do 
anything wrong. 
(4) If A did not do anything wrong, then A does not deserve to be 
blamed (for x-ing) (The Principle of Blameworthiness). 
This gives uS our conclusion: 
For any bad act x and excusing condition y, 
(6) If excusing condition (y) is present, then A does not deserve to be 
blamed for x-ing. 
This is the broad outline of Wallace's theory of why it would be unfair to 
blame someone for an 'excused or involuntary action; put simply, excuses 
show that the agent has not done anything wrong, and it is unfair to blame 
someone if he has not done anything wrong (more specifically, has not 
violated a moral obligation). But, although this is, so far, a very intuitive 
and plausible account, it still does not show why an agent wouldn't have 
done anything wrong if he acted unintentionally, or involuntarily. There 
seems to be a step missing: granted, excuses show that the agent didn't act 
intentionally, but why does a lack of intention immediately imply that the 
agent did not do anything wrong? Why couldn't someone have done 
something unintentionally-say expressed some quality of ill will-and yet 
nonetheless have done something wrong? Recall that this is the point on 
which Wallace criticises Strawson. 
To answer this, Wallace makes the following moves. Issues of moral 
responsibility arise when a person has violated a specifically moral 
obligation. This entails that the 'qualities of will' relevant to moral 
responsibility are those qualities that 'bear of the question of whether ... 
moral obligations have been violated' (199S, p. 12S). And finally : 
12 
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Only if an action expresses a choice of some sort can we say that a 
moral obligation has either been violated or complied with (Wallace 
1998, p. 128).10 
One can only violate a moral obligation intentionally (voluntarily) , simply 
because moral obligations can only be violated intentionally. Therefore, 
moral obligations regulate not body movements, nor attitudes and 
motivations, but choices or intentions. This is a very strong claim, one I 
will consider in a moment. 
To recap briefly, Wallace argues that all the most commonly recognised 
excuses can be understood as defeating the presumption that the agent 
intended to do something bad, or expressed a culpable choice. This 
undermines the appropriateness of blame because if there was no culpable 
choice, the agent did not violate a moral obligation. 
1.7.2 The Argument for PVC 
This, if correct, is a very neat argument for the Principle of Voluntary 
Consent. More formally, 
(I) A is blameworthy for x only if A has violated a moral obligation in x-
ing (by 3&4; hereafter the Principle of Blameworthiness (PB)). 
(2) A violated a moral obligation in x-ing only if A voluntarily 
consented to doing something morally bad (i.e. x) (VM). 
Therefore, 
(3) A is blameworthy for x only if A voluntarily consented to a morally 
bad action (x). 
Or more generally, 
(PVC) For any bad act x, A is blameworthy for x only if A voluntarily 
consented to x. 
But are these premises true? 
lO Wallace specifies that 'choice' may equally well be understood as 'intention' or 'decision' (p. 128) . 
13 
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(PB) An agent is blameworthy for x only if he has violated a moral 
obligation in x-ing. 
(YM) An agent can violate a moral obligation only through a choice to 
do something morally bad. 
PB is analytic. It does not make sense to say that someone is morally 
responsible or blameworthy for a wrong action, but that he has not 
violated a moral obligation in so doing. Conversely, if a person is not 
obliged to do it, or does not have any duty in that regard, then it is plain 
that he cannot be blamed for not doing it. This suggests that everything 
rests on the premise VM, the idea that a moral obligation can only be 
violated through a choice to do something wrong. But how does Wallace 
support this claim: '". one cannot be said to have violated a moral 
obligation in the absence of a relevant quality of choice' (1998, p. 132)? 
He writes: 
The moral obligation of nonmaleficence ... is not simply an obligation 
not to make body movements that harm other people. Rather it is an 
obligation not to act in ways that express the choice to harm other people, 
in the ordinary pursuit of one's own ends (1998, p. 128, my emphasis). 
But this is inconclusive, for it shows only that the obligation of 
nonmaleficence, or more charitably, moral obligations concerning (e.g.) 
cruelty and cheating, logically imply a degree of improper intention of 
choice. Wallace continues: 
Indeed, the degree of our moral fault is determined essentially by the 
quality of the choices on which we act, regardless of whether we achieve 
the ends fixed by these volitional states (1998, p. 128). 
To illustrate, say that Aegisthus maliciously thrusts his spear toward 
Agamemnon, only for it to be deflected by the intervention of the 
beneficent goddess Aphrodite. In this circumstance, the would-be assassin, 
Aegisthus, seems to be morally blameworthy although he did not in fact 
succeed in bringing about harm. This is explained by acknowledging that 
14 
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he did wrong when he made the choice that he did. Thus the appropriate 
target of moral assessment is the agent's will construed as his choice to 
performing the action that would bring about harm. 
However, once again, this shows only that we are sometimes culpable 
for our choices independently from what we bring about; this does not 
necessarily imply that one can only violate a moral obligation through 
choosing to do something wrong. Although we do place great significance 
on the intentions with which actions are performed, this does not 
eliminate the possibility that some unintentional actions or states might 
also be morally blameworthy. 
The inconclusiveness of this claim (YM) has an important consequence 
for Wallace's account of the excusing conditions. I I For it is noteworthy 
that although the most commonly recognised excuses might very well 
function by showing that the agent did not intend to do anything wrong-
did not express a culpable choice-this means that Wallace is only entitled 
to the claim that: 
For a certain class of bad actions X, 
(I) If A is excused from blame for x-ing, then A did not intentionally do 
x. 
But this, of course, does not imply that, 
(2) If A did not intentionally do x, then A is excused from blame. 
This would only follow if it were true that all moral obligations are centred 
exclusively on the agent's culpable choices (YM). Without this claim, the 
possibility remains that an agent may sometimes violate a moral obligation 
even if he did not choose in a culpable manner.12. Thus, although the 
kinds of moral obligations pertinent to the 'most commonly recognised 
11 I will refer to W.!llace's account of the excuses as the Quality of Choice theory. 
12 When I refer to the Quality o f Choice Theol)' I mean Wallace's demonstration that all the major excuses can 
be understood as defeating the presumption of culpable choice (See 1998, p. 136·147). The Quality of Choice 
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excuses might be those that require a culpable choice to be violated, this 
does not entail that there might be other obligations that do not require 
this degree of culpable intention. Perhaps then, only some moral 
obligations can be violated intentionally ; perhaps some other moral 
obligations that do not govern choices. The most obvious candidates for 
blameworthiness without culpable choice are occaSIOns of culpable 
ignorance: in these circumstances, ignorance does not serve as an 
excusing condition, although it does show that the agent did not intend to 
do anything wrong at the time of his action. 13 These cases apparently 
violate VM, for although the agent did not choose to do anything wrong at 
the time of his action, he is not thought to escape blame. 
Of course, Wallace is well aware of this difficulty and has a solution 
ready to hand. In the Chapter 2, I discuss ignorance as an excusing 
condition in some detail, and outline Wallace's explanation for culpable 
ignorance. However, before proceeding, I present Wallace's explanation 
for why moral obligations should be centred exclusively on agents' choices. 
1.7.3 Choice and Reasons-Responsiveness 
As already noted, Wallace infers from the premise VM-moral obligations 
can only be violated if the agent makes a choice to do so-that moral 
obligations regulate not body movements, nor qualities of emotion or 
desire or attitude, but the quality of choice, as it is expressed in action. By 
making this move, he excludes such attitudes as affection and indifference 
from the space of moral obligation. Since we do not choose to express 
such attitudes, they could never violate a moral obligation. In the previous 
sub-section, I suggested VM is at best inconclusive; however Wallace does 
is independent from the claim VM, for all it requires is that ill the 1IIai11 lypes of excuses, the obligations in 
question do pertain to an agent's choices. This is not the strong claim thaI al! moral obligations are such. 
13 Another potential difficulty concerns the law's recognition of strict liabilit.y offences, that is, o ITences that do 
not require any quali ty of imention (these arc usually such things as traffic offences, or breaches of cont ractual 
agreements). Whether or nO[ there arc good legal reasons for these la\\'5 is a malter that I will nOt go into here. 
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provide all argument as to why moral obligations are focused on agents' 
choices. 
Wallace claims-I think plausibly-that if someone genuinely accepts a 
moral obligation then he will have something to say-in the form of some 
or other moral principle-in support of that obligation. He sees this 
commitment to the justification of the moral principles that one accepts as 
a precondition for the stance of holding someone morally responsible. 14 
Furthermore. since the principles that justify moral obligations 'articulate 
reasons for acting in conformity with these obligations' (1998. p. 130). the 
stance of holding a person morally :'esponsible involves a commitment to 
justifications that could motivate the person held responsible to comply 
with the obligations (Wallace 1998. p. 130). This implies that moral 
obligations must regulate states that are directly sensitive to the influence 
of reasons. Moral obligations do not extend to emotions. or feelings or 
bodily movements, since these states cannot be controlled simply by the 
'belief that there are moral considerations which make them obligatory' 
(p. 132.). 
As I have formulated it. the PVC is a principle about action. but it is 
plain that the principle naturally extends to any (e.g.) states. emotions or 
desires that are not brought about through an exerCise of choice. 
According to Wallace's present argument. if a state is not within the 
agent's voluntary control. it is not directly susceptible to the influence of 
reasons. But since the stance of holding someone morally responsible 
involves a commitment to being able to motivate the agent towards 
compliance. Wallace argues that states not within the agent's voluntary 
control are not appropriate objects of moral obligation. and hence moral 
blame. 
bUI suffice (0 say that the law may diverge rrom morality in some areas because it mUSt take heed o f a broader 
set of practica l questions. See Han (1968), 
14 See Chapter 3 
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I will return to this argument later in Chapter 4, but for the moment 
just one quick point. The claim that moral obligations govern states that 
are directly susceptible to the influence of reasons is logically independent 
from VM, the principle that a moral obligation an only be violated 
through an intentional wrongdoing. For moral obligations might regulate 
states responsive to reasons without it being true that an agent can only 
violate a moral obligation through an intentional wrongdoing. The 
possibility I have in mind is one where some unintentional actions violate 
moral obligations, while it still being the case that stance of holding 
someone responsible necessarily involves a commitment to justifying the 
moral principle to which one holds that person, and to motivating 
compliance with that obligation. 
1.6 Conclusion 
My main aim in this chapter has been to understand the plausibility of the 
Principle of Voluntary Consent. I proposed that justifying PVC-
confirming its adequacy as a normative principle regulating moral 
responsibility-requires explaining why it would be unfair to blame a 
person for an involuntary action. This entails that an account be given of 
why excuses should make blame unfair. To this end, I traced a route 
through various prominent theories, eventually invoking Wallace's Quality 
of Choice Theory in support of PVC. According to this theory, PVC is 
correct, simply because moral obligations regulate choices, such that one 
cannot, in fact, violate a moral obligation except through a culpable 
quality of choice. In the next Chapter, I explain how a proponent of PVC 
must explain the phenomenon of culpable ignorance. 
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2. Culpable Ignorance: Factual and Moral 
The excusing condition of ignorance is of especial significance in assessing 
the Principle of Voluntary Consent. This is because, quite simply, it does 
not always excuse. Gideon Rosen (2002) illustrates: 
Suppose I walk down a crowded sidewalk with my nose in a book. When 
I knock you over it does me no good to say, 'But I didn't know you were 
there!' This might be true, and in another context it might signal an 
excuse ... In this case, however, while I do act from ignorance, in the 
sense that I would have acterl differently had I known better, my 
ignorance is obviously no excuse whatsoever (p. 62). 
Instances of culpable ignorance such as this apparently conflict with PVC 
because the agent did not intentionally to do anything wrong, but 
nonetheless seems culpable for his action. As in Rosen's example, the 
agent was in fact ignorant that he would end up knocking another person 
over. However, he should not have been ignorant, for this was a busy city 
street. We may put the point more generally, and say that if one acts in 
ignorance, then one has not acted voluntarily; and yet, if that ignorance is 
not accepted as an excuse, then one might nonetheless still be to blame. 
Therefore, the possibility of culpable ignorance suggests an occasion 
where someone is blameworthy for an action despite having involuntarily 
done something wrong. 
Ignorance as an excusing condition may be divided into two categories: 
(i) ignorance of fact, and (ii) moral ignorance. I And in both cases, there is 
a possibility that the ignorance will not excuse such that the agent may be 
blameworthy for an involuntary action. My aim in this chapter is to show 
I It is noteworthy that. for Arislolle, ignorance of faci is the only type of ignorance that does excuse: he claims that 
persons are blamed for ignorance of universal moral rules: 'It is nO[ mistaken purpose that that makes an action 
involuntary (it makes men wicked), nor ignorance of the univcnal (for that men are blamed), but ignorance of the 
particulars. i.l!. of the circumstances of the aClion and objecL'> with which it is concerned. For it is on these that both 
pardon and pity depend, since the person who is ignorant of these acts involuntarily' (N . E .. p. 51). 
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how a proponent of PVC is committed to explaining culpable ignorance, 
both factual and moral. 
2.1 Ignorance of Fact 
To be in a position to fully understand cases of culpable ignorance, I must 
say a few words on how factual ignorance excuses, when it does. I will do 
this in the context of showing how the Quality of Choice Theory explains 
a successful excuse from ignorance. 2 
On the Quality of Choice theory, excuses from factual ignorance 
show simply that the agent did not voluntarily do anything wrong. 
Ignorance defeats the presumption that a person did x intentionally, by 
showing the he did not know that what he chose would turn out to be of a 
kind x (Wallace 1998, pp. 136-137). For if a person thinks that he his 
choosing to do y, but he in fact brings about x, then he does not 
voluntarily choose to bring about x. Even if x is a state of affairs that might 
be described as objectively bad, he does not violate a moral obligation 
simply by bringing about this state. This is because, according to VM, a 
person can only contravene a moral obligation against doing x through a 
choice to do something that contravenes x. For example, a person can 
only violate the moral obligation of nonmaleficance by choosing to act in 
ways that harm other people (Wallace 1998, p. 128). Thus, it seems one 
cannot one cannot break a moral prohibition against doing x in 
Ignorance. 
The epistemic failure in which someone is ignorant of fact corresponds 
to the excusing conditions of inadvertence, mistake or accident (Wallace 
1998, p 136).3 When someone does something inadvertently, he does not 
2 I refer (0 Wallace' s account of the excuses as the Quality of Choice theory (QCT).Although. as noted in Chapter I. QCT 
requires VM to explain why the lack of culpable choice shou ld make blame unfair. QCT is strictly speaking not 
committed (0 the strong claim that all moral obligations require Ihis degree of culpable choice. VM implies the QCT. but 
QCT does not entail VM, for QCT may plausibly cover occasions when someone does get off the hook . See Section 1.7.2. 
3 The paragraphs on inadvenence. mistake and accident draw heavily on Wallace (1998. pp. 136- 139), 
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anticipate that a certain consequence would occur when he chooses to 
embark on some activity. For example, a person may inadvertently set off 
the house alarm by brushing against the panic button as she rushes out of 
the house on her way to work. In gathering her things together and 
hurtling down the passage, she did not anticipate that she would set off 
the alarm. There is no culpability inhering in her 'choice' because she 
made a choice to rush off to work and not to set off the alarm; she may, 
however, be vulnerable to accusations of carelessness or recklessness 
(Wallace 1998, p. 137). By contrast, when someone does something by 
mistake, he may intend to perform ;. :J. action of the kind that he does 
perform, but because of ignorance of some detail, does not perform the 
particular action he intended to. For example, I intend to borrow your 
umbrella since you'd said I could, but I make a mistake with the brollies, 
and take my landlord's instead. In this case, the excuse shows that I did 
not do anything morally wrong because I made an honest mistake: I did 
not steal my landlord's umbrella because theft requires an improper 
intention on my part and this is what my ignorance shows that I didn't 
have. Finally, the excuse 'by accident' shows that in the course of doing 
something a person intended to do, something 'befalls' him so that he 
does not execute the designs he had hoped. In this respect, when the 
agent set about whatever resulted in the accident, he did not know that he 
would end up bringing about this result.· Furthermore, things omitted in 
ignorance, may also be excused if it can be shown that one has 
inadvertently, or mistakenly omitted to do something that one should 
have done. Someone may inadvertently omit to turn off the house alarm, 
if, say, she was listening to music on her headphones and did not know 
4 To illustrate !'ecaJl J.L Austin's example: 
You have n donkey, so have r. and they graze in the same field. The day comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to 
shoot it. draw a bead on ii, fire ... but as I do so, the beam move, and to my horror, yours falls (1970, p. 185). 
The excuse shows thaI Austin did not intend to shoot his neighbour's donkey, and in this sense did not violate any 
obligation against (say) destroying another's propcr1y. The excuse gels him off the hook because when he made the 
decision to shoot his donkey lacked the foreknowledge that he would end up shooting his neighbour's instead. 
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that the alarm had gone off. Similarly, one may mistakenly omit to turn 
on the house alarm, if one programmed the alarm for the basement 
instead. In my opinion, Wallace is correct when he claims that one cannot 
omit to do something by accident (1998, p. 137). 
These then are the excuses from factual ignorance. The unifying theme 
has been that the excuse defeats the presumption that the agent has 
intended to do wrong. By VM, this entails that he did not violate any 
moral obligation. One qualification is in order in that the excuses from 
mistake or accident may not succeed if the choice to perform an action of 
the type the agent intended to perform-but did not succeed in bringing 
about- was itself culpable. Gideon Rosen (2002) formulates this as follows: 
'When X does A from blameless ignorance, then X is blameless for doing 
A, provided the act would have been blameless if things had been as the 
agent took them to be' (p. 63). Ifa brazen thief decides to steal Jones's car, 
but mistakenly steals Radley's, he is hardly excused from blame since the 
intention to steal a car (any car) is morally culpable. 
The Quality of Choice theory makes good sense of the excuses from 
ignorance of fact. In these cases, then agent is excused from moral 
responsibility because he did not voluntarily consent to doing anything 
wrong. In my opinion, our moral intuitions coincide with PVC here; more 
specifically, we can see that the moral obligations that were not violated 
were ones that would require a degree of improper intention. In the next 
section, I show how a proponent of PVC explains culpable ignorance. 
2.1.1 Culpable Ignorance of Fact 
How does an adherent of PVC cope with cases of culpable ignorance? To 
restate the problem, PVC says that for every blameworthy act, the agent 
must have voluntarily done something bad. But, when we say that 
someone acted from culpable ignorance we mean that he is blameworthy 
22 
for an involuntary action. Are these counter-examples to PVC? Let us re-
examine the Rosen's example mentioned above; I restate it here for 
convemence: 
Suppose I walk down a crowded sidewalk with my nose in a book. When 
I knock you over it does me no good to say, 'But I didn't know you were 
there!' This might be true, and in another context it might signal an 
excuse .. .In this case, however, while I do act from ignorance, in the 
sense that I would have acted differently had I known better, my 
ignorance is obviously no excuse whatsoever (Rosen 2002, p. 62).' 
What does a proponent of PVC say about a case like this? Wallace (1998) 
writes: 
[Ignorance may] not be accepted [as an excuse] if the ignorance that 
makes what one did unintentional is itself culpable. In that case, it will 
be taken not as a valid excuse, but evidence one of a difference family 
of faults that includes negligence, carelessness, forgetfulness and 
recklessness (p. 138). 
This seems plausible in that G was reckless or negligent because, as a city-
dweller, he is expected to keep a look out for others when he walks down 
the road (cf. Rosen 2002, p. 63). However, it is plain that this response 
only postpones the question: for to say that culpable ignorance is 
negligent, careless, forgetful or reckless now requires us to accommodate 
these faults within the framework allowed by PVC.6 For, granted, G was 
reckless, but does this mean that he voluntarily consented to some wrong 
action? 
It does III fact, slllce recklessness involves the foreseen probability of 
harm, whereas in negligence, the agent is usually completely unaware of 
the quality of his actions (Houlgate 1968, p. 114). A reckless action is not 
5 I refer to the culpable walker as '0' to distinguish him from Rosen the philosopher. 
6 Indeed the apparent tcnsion in saying that an agent is gllilty of negligence is usually overlooked. Guill is supposed to 
require that an act have been voluntary (cf. Williams 1985. p. 178), but acts done though negligence are obviously not 
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then performed in ignorance of the possibility of risk, although the agent 
may not anticipate the gravity of the consequences he brings about. 
Presumably this means that G anticipated the possibility that reading his 
book might lead to him colliding with a passer-by.7 Therefore, when he 
chose to read his book anyway, he was not in complete ignorance of risk. 
He may therefore be to blame, at least, for the quality of will expressed in 
his choice to disregard the possibility of risk.s Therefore, PVC is 
preserved: Gideon voluntarily consented to a culpable action, namely to 
walk down the road with his nose in his book. 
Cases of negligence or carelessness are more difficult for they may be 
done in complete ignorance of the effects of one's actions. Although 
negligence is sometimes understood in terms of a 'failure to take 
reasonable precautions against harm', insofar as this expression connotes 
a deliberate failure to take precautions, it diverges from common usage in 
which the 'necessity for the precautions was not appreciated' and the 'failure 
to take them arose from a failure to attend to and appreciate the risks' 
(Hart, 1962, p. 259, my emphasis; cf. Wallace 1998, p. 139). Moreover, 
negligence as the 'failure to take reasonable precautions ' seems most 
appropriate to cover cases where the activity is done in a careless manner 
(Hart 1968, p. 260). This is to note the distinction between 'doing an 
action carelessly', and 'carelessly doing an action', the former pertaining 
to the manner of executing an activity, while the latter, the actual doing of 
certain things (Hart 1968, p. 260). Consider for example the difference 
between, 'Radley waved the gun about carelessly' , as opposed to, 'Radley 
carelessly waved the gun about'. The first conveys the idea that, while 
performing the action, the agent failed to exercise due care, while the 
voluntary in this sense. Granted. the agent 'should have known', but then 'knowing' is also not within the scope of one's 
voluntary control. 
7 Hart (1968) points out that there is some discrepancy in the law as to whether the term 'reckless' shou ld be reserved for 
occasions where the agent 'consciously appreciated the gravity of the risk' or whether the agent was aware of some risk 
without 'appreciation of its gravity (p. 26 1). 
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second suggests that the agent was not really fully aware of what he was 
doing in performing the act that he did. 
Now, discussions of negligence are apt to be full of expressions such as 
'acting without due care' and 'failing to act as a reasonable person might'; 
but how do these terms help to preserve PVC? They do not obviously 
indicate any link to an agent's choices. Moreover, in cases where a person 
has been negligent, we think that he deserves to be blamed for his 
behaviour. He may not have voluntarily performed any bad action, but he 
seems blameworthy anyway. As Barbara Herman (1993) remarks, when 
someone is negligent or careless and does not do what she ought to do, 
she very well might be acting on a 'routinely permissible maxim' that 
expresses her 'intention to do some ordinary action', while, without then 
recognising it, be violating a moral obligation such as (e.g.) breaking a 
promise (p. 99).9 The difficulty is then to explain how the agent could be 
to blame if he has not has expressed a relevant culpable 'quality of choice' 
at the time of his action. 
The Tracing Principle is offered as a way of doing this. 
2.1.2 The Tracing Principle 
In this section I explain the strategy an adherent of PVC is committed to 
employing in order to explain the phenomenon of culpable ignorance. In 
the last section, I explained that when a person is culpably ignorant-
ignorance fails to excuse him-then he has been negligent or careless, 
and has not discharged his duties properly. However, for this to be any 
help in rescuing PVC, that person must have voluntarily and culpably 
failed to do his duties. 
8 It is a d ifficull question as to what extent, and for what. the agent is morally responsible. If someone recklessly assumes 
some risk with disastrous consequences, is he more to blame than were he to fortuitously escape these consequences~ The 
same question will arise with respect to negligence; I will discuss it in more detail below. 
9 Hetman's (1993) discussion is in the context of defending the Kanlian view that 'willings' are exclusive bearers of 
mornl worth: '(t)hings thai happen are not themselves morally good or bad, right or wrong: only willings arc' (p. 94). Her 
concerns are thus similar to Wallace's, with his commitment to the premise that a culpable choice is required ror (he 
violation or a moral obligation (VM). 
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And this is exactly what proponents of PVC do say: cases of 
negligence have to be traced to earlier episodes of choice (Wallace 1998, 
p. 139). Let us call this the 'Tracing Principle': ignorance is culpable ifit is 
due to negligence, where having been negligent is to have previously 
made culpable choices, or culpably omitted to make choices. In this way, 
negligence is explained in terms of prior culpable actions or omissions (cf. 
Herman 1993). It is important to emphasise that these previous exercises 
of choice must themselves be culpable, since one could not be blameworthy 
on the basis of previous choices that were excused from blame (say if they 
too were made in ignorance). 
This then is how adherents of PVC explain the culpable ignorance 
exemplified in negligent and careless actions: ignorance is culpable only if 
it is due to prior culpable voluntary actions and omissions, more 
specifically those that the agent knew might lead to his later failure to 
fulfil his duties. Accordingly, PVC is amended as follows: 
PVC*) For any bad act x, A is blameworthy for x only if(l) A voluntarily 
consented to x, or (2) A's doing x is traceable to earlier bad acts which 
A voluntarily consented to doing. 
The Tracing Principle does not locate the moral fault at the time of the 
action but 'looks back in time' to earlier occasions of moral fault. Indeed, 
part of the strategy here is to widen the scope of moral judgement, to look 
to maxims of 'preparation' that are adopted before the time of action 
(Herman 1993, p. 10 I). 'An agent with an obligation does not therefore 
stand in some simple relation to a required action' (Herman 1993, p. 
101); rather the notion of obligation is extended to include a complex set 
of projects and sub-projects to which the agent becomes committed when 
he acquires the obligation. The implementation of a whole range of sub-
projects may required of the agent to ensure that he fulfils his duties and 
may form part of one and the same obligation (Herman 1993, p. 102). In 
this way, the Tracing Principle preserves VM: the agent who has been 
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negligent has violated an obligation, where this obligation is understood 
as involving many different culpable actions and omissions, all being part 
of the same moral obligation. 
Cases of negligence or carelessness are thereby explained by looking to 
moral faults that correspond to the PVC-that is the agent chose to do 
something that he knew might lead to him doing something morally 
impermissible-located back in time from when the actual culpably 
ignorant action occurred. As Herman (1993) writes: 
So at the time of the apparent moral failure, it is true that the agent's 
maxim of action is not faulty or impermissible. Yet we can identify her 
moral failure in what she did, or did not do, prior to the time of action, 
in maxims that were not adequate as means (p. 101). 
In order to make the Tracing Principle clearer, let us apply the strategy to 
a concrete example. The most plausible examples to illustrate this 
principle are those where someone is explicitly informed of his duties, but 
voluntarily omits to adopt maxims of preparation such that he will ensure 
that he meets his obligations. Wallace illustrates with the example of 
someone-call him Brown-agreeing to act as a baby sitter, and then due to 
not taking sufficient measures to ensure the fulfilment of his duties, 
inadvertently treading on the young child's hand (Wallace 1998, pp. 138-
139). 
In this sort of case, Brown has voluntarily agreed to look after the child, 
and is presumably aware that this involves keeping track of the child's 
movements. However, instead of implementing a procedure to ensure that 
he meets his duties-'maxims of preparation'-he decides to watch 
television, cook himself some dinner, and drinks a beer. He intends to 
make regular checks on the child, but puts this off, telling himself that he 
will do so just a little later on. The result of Brown's slacking off is that 
that when he gets up to fetch another beer from the fridge, he does not 
realise that the child is crawling about around the corner and 
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inadvertently treads on the child's hand, causing some injury. Two issues 
are salient here: 
I. Brown's ignorance of the child's whereabouts will serve to show that he 
didn't mean to step on his hand. The inadvertence with which he injured 
the child breaks the connection between his will and action, such that his 
act does not reflect a faulty choice at the time of the action. However, he is 
opened up to a charge of negligence, since he failed to take steps to 
properly uphold the agreement he had undertaken (p. 138): his 
responsibility resides in him not taking proper care to guard against the 
undesirable state of affairs. 
2. How, precisely, does the Tracing Principle explain Brown's fault? As 
noted by Herman (1993), the failure in this sort of case resides in the 
agent's failures of preparation. Spelling this out in detail, Brown agreed to 
look after the child, and he knew that this involved keeping a careful rein 
on his movements. However, instead of sedulously checking on the child's 
movements, he culpably chose to watch television, and slack off in his 
duties. In this way he omitted to do what was required of him, by choosing 
to do something else instead of what would have led to his meeting his 
obligation. Brown's negligence is explained by his voluntary omitting to 
do what was required of him despite being fully aware of what was 
expected of him. These voluntary omissions are culpable because they are 
done in awareness that doing other activities instead might lead to a 
failure to measure up to his commitments. 10 
10 Another Question that arises is, what, exactly is Brown i~ blameworthy for? Recall that his ignorance still 
serves, for that particular action, to break the identification between the outcome (treading on the baby's hand) 
and his intentions. He did not cause the injury on purpose, but he should not have caused the injury al all 
because he should not have been negligent. The question is whether he is to blame for consequences of his 
negligence, in Holly Smith's (1983) phrasing, 'the unwitting wrongful act(s)'. or 10 blame only for the 
'bcnighting act' or acts, that is, initial acts 'in which the agent fails to improve (or positively impairs) his 
cognitive position' (p. 547). In the case at hand, the question is whether Brown is (0 blame for the child's injury. 
or only for the choices to do something other that carry out the expected routine checks. 
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In summary, an adherent of PVC is committed to explaining the 
possibility of culpable ignorance by means of the Tracing Principle in 
order to preserve the thesis that agents are blameworthy only for their 
voluntary acts and omissions. More specifically, the Tracing Principle 
enables Wallace to preserve VM, the thesis that a moral obligation can 
only be violated through a culpable choice. As it seems to me, the Tracing 
Principle is at its most plausible in circumstances when the agent has 
entered into an well specified agreement and so voluntarily acquires 
duties to ensure that certain (arranged) states obtain. For in the case of a 
voluntarily acquired contract, he will not be ignorant of his duties, and his 
negligence will perhaps then be traceable to a choice to not pay proper 
heed to these duties-a choice not to take 'reasonable precautions'. 
However it is far from clear that the Tracing Principle is tenable for a host 
of other cases. In Chapter 4 I argue that the Tracing Principle cannot 
account for all cases of culpable ignorance. 
2.2 Moral Ignorance 
In the last section I discussed ignorance of fact as an excusing condition: 
instances where a person is ignorant of some crucial factual detail of the 
circumstances, causing him to do something that he did not intend or 
choose to do. As already mentioned, the pertinence of ignorance as an 
excusing condition for evaluating the Principle of Voluntary Consent 
emerges through the possibility of culpable ignorance. In these cases, the 
agent does not intend to do wrong because he is ignorant-his infraction is 
involuntary- but he does not escape blame because he is culpable for 
having acted in ignorance. I showed how proponents of PVC are 
Th is question is not central to my arguments in this dissertation. I require only thal agents' be somet imes 
blamed for negligence and carelessness. If some instances o f negligence or carelessness C'dnnot be explained by 
the Tracing Principle. then my claim will go through irrespective of what, exactly, the agent is blameworthy for. 
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committed to explaining culpable ignorance- where this indicates 
negligence or carelessness- by means of the Tracing Principle. 
However, in addition to factual ignorance, it also seems possible that 
someone may be ignorant of moral details particular to the situation. In 
this regard, Gideon Rosen (2002) suggests that 'one can fail to know a 
general moral rule ... [or] ... that people have certain rights, or that one 
has certain duties' (p. 64).11 If this is right, then moral ignorance serving 
in an excuse raises concerns analogous to those generated by factual 
ignorance. For, moral ignorance may also render an action unintentional, 
such that the agent would not have voluntarily consented to any bad 
action, and yet, his being morally ignorant might nonetheless be culpable. 
Therefore, culpable moral ignorance is also apparently in conflict with the 
Principle of Voluntary Consent. 
However, as will become apparent in the next section, moral ignorance 
may-in contrast with factual ignorance- function to inhibit blame in 
another way than by rendering the action unintentional (and hence 
involuntary). But this means that there are cases of moral ignorance that 
do not pose a threat to PVC. 
My aim in the next two sections is to show how ignorance of a 'general 
moral rule' is to be understood if it is to render and act involuntary. The 
way I do this is indirect: In Section 2.2.1 examine Gideon Rosen's (2002) 
example of blameless moral ignorance of a moral rule in order to 
demonstrate that Rosen's example cannot be conceived of in terms of 
moral ignorance rendering an act unintentional (involuntary). Then, by 
drawing on the themes emerging from this discussion, I show in Section 
2.2.2 how moral ignorance might be understood so that it does provide a 
challenge to PVC, one that is analogous to that generated by culpable 
II He also proposes II third and fourth: 'one can fail to know what one should do in a particular case., and that II 
pllrlicul ar act is cruel or abusive' (p. 64), As wi ll become clear, once the distinction between moral ignoran ce serving in an 
excuse, and moral ignomnce in a (morally) unjustified action is in place, it will be evident that these proposals are not 
candidates for ignorance serving to render an aCls involuntary. They do nOI therefore pose a threat (0 PVC--exa mples that 
do arc those where the act is involuntary and culpable. For Ihi s reason then, I omi t discussion of these suggestions. 
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factual ignorance. The issue of whether Rosen is right in thinking that his 
is indeed a case of blameless moral ignorance is not something that I need 
to commit myself on. 
2.2.1 Moral! y Unjustified Action 
As an example of ignorance of a general moral rule, Rosen offers the 
example of chattel slavery, the kind of which took place in the Near East 
during the Biblical period. This kind of slavery differs from (e.g.) slavery 
in America, which rested on mistaken views concerning racial differences, 
in that almost anyone could become a slave through bad luck or 
imprudence (Rosen 2002, p. 65). In this respect, Rosen claims, chattel 
slavery is not an instance of factual ignorance, but of moral ignorance. 
Furthermore, in Rosen's opinion, a (morally ignorant) slave owner who 
(say) forces labour without compensation, or beats his slaves, is to be 
excused from blame, since he is ignorant of the moral status of his actions, 
and his ignorance is not in any sense, due to negligence. Quite on the 
contrary, says Rosen, it would have taken a 'moral genius' to 'see through 
the wrongness of chattel slavery' (p. 66). 
Rosen employs the term 'excuse' to designate any 'fact that defeats the 
standing presumption of responsibility' (p. 61). However, recalling 
Austin's distinction between an 'excuse' and Justification', we can see that 
there are important differences glossed over in Rosen's use of the term 
('excuse'). For both excuses and justifications, if successful, serve to show 
that A does not deserve blame for his act. When someone attempts to 
escape sanction by justifYing his conduct, he admits that he did x, but 
argues that doing x was a 'good thing, or the right or sensible thing, or a 
permissible thing to do, either in general or the special circumstances of 
the occasion' (Austin 1970, p. 176). On the other hand, Austin claims that 
excuses function differently in that the person will admit that x is bad, but 
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claim that he did not (straightforwardly) do x. 'In one defence, we accept 
responsibility but deny that it is bad: in the other we admit that it was bad 
but don't accept full, or even any, responsibility' (p. 176).12 
With this distinction in place, it is plain that the Hittite slave-owner's 
ignorance to be described as a case of falsely believing that one is justified 
in performing certain acts . We may understand this by distinguishing 
between subjective and objective senses of justification for belief. The 
Hittite believes that he is entitled to certain forms of behaviour with 
respect to his slaves, and in this sense his belief is subjectively justified. 
However, his belief is not objectively justified since he is not, as a matter of 
moral fact, entitled to this sort of behaviour. I will refer to this kind of 
error as acting from an (objectively) unjustified belief13 
The sort of ignorance exhibited in an action from an unjustified belief, if 
it inhibits blame, does so in a quite different way than ignorance serving as 
an excuse .14 To see this, consider that when the slave-owner beats his 
slaves, he is not ignorant of what he is doing. He intends (or voluntarily 
chooses) to beat them because he (say) believes that they are his property 
and this therefore justifies this form of behaviour. If questioned as to what 
right he has to treat them in this way, he would presumably simply cite the 
fact that they are his slaves. Crucially, the Hittite accepts full responsibility 
(it was his action-he intended it) for his actions, but believes that beating 
his slaves is something he is entitled to do. He claims that he is fully 
12 To illustrate brieny, suppose that one rainy Monday, Gibbs takes Radley's umbrella with her to work. Later in the day, 
Radley, exceedingly irritated as having been soaked in the rain. confronts Gibbs and accuses her of having 'taken' her 
umbrella. It seems that Gibbs, should she want to defend herself of the charge, will likely say one of two things: 
(I) She may claim thai she did not realise that it was Radley' s umbrella bUI thought it was her own, and thus that she took 
the umbrella by mistake. 
(2) She may claim that she took the umbrella, but only because she was going to ajob interview, and was late and couldn't 
afford to be wet. 
Assuming that Radley finds this a good enough justification, Gibbs will escape blame in both cases. However, the \\ ay in 
which blame is inhibi ted is very different, in that in the first case, Gibbs denies that really she performed the culpable 
action, while in the second case, she attempts to show that it was not really a culpable action in the circumstances. 
13 I omit for the most part the qualification 'objective'. 
14 Following Austin (1970). this is in the sense of a particular kind of blame-inhibitor to be distinguished from cases 
where the agent lries to justify his behaviour. 
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responsible for those actions-he did them; they are his actions-but they 
are not morally impermissible in these circumstances. ls 
By contrast, in a typical case of ignorance as an excuse, the agent acts in 
a way other than he intends-he intends to perform an action of type X-
but because of ignorance performs an action of type Y. He does not do 
what he intended to do (whereas the Hittite does exactly what he intended 
to do-there is no question of inadvertence or mistake here). Importantly, 
he believes that one should not do things of type X: he accepts the moral 
demand. However he tries to show that he is not responsible for happened 
(it was not really his action), because he was trying to do something quite 
different and something that is morally permissible (type y)16 (Recall the 
qualification from Section 2.2: A is blameless only if he would have been 
blameless had things been as he took them to be. Thus if A was trying to 
do something morally unacceptable he will still be to blame even if he did 
not get to perform the action he intended to.) 
As is evident from the above, the key difference between cases of 
ignorance as an excuse and being mistaken about whether a certain course 
of action is justified, resides in the role of the belief in the action. With 
inadvertence, mistake and accident, the agent lacks a certain relevant 
belief about the circumstances, such that he commits an infraction 
unintentionally. However, when an agent acts in a morally unjustified manner, 
this is due to his thinking such that an intentional performance of that 
very action would be justified. 
15 Ignorance serves in an actioll done from (III unjustified belie/when: 
(I) S imelllionally does x. 
(2) S does not believe that x is morally impermissible. 
(3) S believes that actions of rype X are morally justified. 
(4) If S had access to other facts (moral or non-mora!), S would realise that actions of type X are morally unjustified 
16 ignorance functions as an excuse under the following conditions: 
(1) S intends to do x. 
(2) x is nol of a morally impermissible Iype. 
(3) On accOUni of ignorance, S uI/intelltiollally does something of Iype Y. 
(4) Y is morally impermissible. 
S will normally accept that Y is morally impermissible. This is because ill the context of an excuse the agent is trying to 
show that he did not really do the wrong action: he is trying 10 escape sanction . Moreover, although it is possible than 
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Rosen's aim IS to understand whether the principle of culpable 
ignorance-when a person acts from ignorance, he is culpable for his 
action only ifhe is culpable for the ignorance from which he acts' (p. 61)-
extends to moral as well as factual ignorance17 Whether or not th is is 
correct, it is plain that the ignorance at work in the Hittite example 
functions quite differently from ignorance in a typical excuse. Ignorance 
of fact causes the agent to do something other than he intended, whereas 
in the examples Rosen provides, the agent's moral 'ignorance' contributes 
to his being mistaken in thinking certain of his (intentional) actions are 
justified. IS 
Why is this distinction important? Firstly, ignorance understood in this 
way (in terms of acting from an unjustified belief) poses no problem for 
PVC, for the agent's action in this type of case in fully voluntary. But PVC 
says that someone is blameworthy only if he has acted voluntarily, and not 
that if he acted voluntarily then he is blameworthy. Thus even if Rosen 's 
examples are cases where the agent does deserve to be blamed, i. e. is not 
to be 'excused', they are not germane to my interests in this dissertation. 
Counter-examples to the Principle of Voluntary Consent could only be 
those in which the agent has acted involuntarily because of moral 
ignorance and yet, nonetheless, deserves to be blamed. But how could 
someone might claim that he didn't do the act, but that he doesn't think it wou ld be wrong if he had done it, this will 
amount to him thinking that the act would have been justified in that context (despite the facilhal he didn't do it). 
17 It is noteworthy thaI Rosen (2002) rejects both the Quality o f Will theory and (something recognisable as the) Quali ty 
of Choice theory because both fail 10 give what Rosen believes is the correct answer, namely Ih!lt the Hittite is blameless. 
In my view the distinction between ignorance as an excuse, and ignorance resulting in an unjustified belief. may be 
invoked to bring things into perspective. 801h the Quality of Choice and Quality of Will theories operate withi n the 
parameters of Austin 's understanding of 'excuse': cases in which the agent accepts that the act is bad, and that the excuse 
(ignorance) renders the bad act ·uni ntentional'. Therefore, they do not even purport to explai n the cases Rosen has in 
mind, A theory of the excuses will not necessari ly cover cases of actions done because o f being mistaken about the 
application of moral rules. 
18 Rosen's other examples of mora! ignorance seem even more obviously cases of acting from lin ulljuslified belief He 
gives the example of Smith, a 1950s sexist father who gives his sons opportunities denied to his daughters. However, once 
again th is seems to be a case of someone believing that certain courses of action are justified in virtue of some or other 
fac t. This need not imply that Smi th has some developed theory of gender and the various capabil ities that are disuibuted 
unevenly across the sexes; Rosen is qui te correct to note that Smith simply takes it for granted-'as an undefended axiom 
of moral common sense' (p. 67)-that his sons will go on to have certain opport unities that will not be available to his 
daughters. The fact remains therefore that Smith does not act from ignorance such that he did not do what he intended to 
do. but acts voluntarily o n a belief that he sincerely yet falsely believes to be justified, 
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moral ignorance render an act unin tentional? This is the topic of the next 
section. 
2.2.2 Moral Ignorance as an Excuse 
T here are a class of general moral rules that could never be unintentionally 
violated through moral ignorance. More specifically, for this class of moral 
rule (to anticipate Chapter 3, call these 'negative duties'), moral ignorance 
could only inhere in a morally unjustified action. What moral rules are 
these, and why is this the case? 
Negative duties pertain to a class of action broadly relating to the 
intentional inflicting of injury. Charles Taylor (1989) highlights this in the 
following passage: 
Perhaps the most urgent and powerful cluster of demands that we 
recognise as moral concern the respect for life, integrity, and wellbeing, 
even flourishing, of others. These are the ones we infringe when we kill 
or maim others, steal their property, strike fear into them and rob 
them of peace, or even refrain from helping them when they are in 
distress. Virtually everyone feels these demands, and they have been 
and are acknowledged in all human societies (1989, p. 4). 
I claim that a moral obligation governing these forms of behaviour could 
never be violated unintentionally through moral ignorance. My argument 
is simply this: If an agent sets about to cause physical injury (let's say 
torture) then he knows what he is doing. But if he knows what he is doing, 
then either he thinks that he is justified, or he knows that it is wrong but 
does not really care. If he thinks it is justified then has a certain divergent 
conception of when this form of behaviour is appropriate. A normally 
functioning human agent could not be ignorant that inflicting severe 
physical injury is wrong simpliciter, for this type of action is one of a class of 
action that is, and has been throughout history, morally impermissible in 
some contexts . Therefore this agent, if he thinks he is justified, has a 
different idea of when to apply a moral rule prohibiting (e.g.) torture . 
35 
'Culture and upbringing may help to define the boundaries of ... relevant 
"others", but they don't seem to create the basic reaction itself (Taylor 
1989, p. 5). The point is that -as in the example of slavery-a fundamental 
principle against harm may be limited such that some people are thought 
to deserve to be treated one way, while others-for one or another reason-
merit differential treatment. But, if inflicting severe physical injury is 
disallowed in one context, the continued performance of such actions 
requires justification when transferred into another context. If the action 
is not to be altogether avoided, then it must be justified. ('It is torture, but 
this is war!,) This indicates that for a large class of moral demands-
roughly speaking, those concerning physical wellbeing of others-
ignorance of a moral rule can only be understood in terms of an 
ignorance of the scope of a moral rule. I think that similar considerations 
apply, mutatis mutandis, when someone fails to know that a group of 
people have certain rights: this is to believe that they don't have those 
rights, i.e . to believe that one is justified in treating them as though they 
don't. 
On the other hand, consider the following statements: (1) 'I'm sorry, 
I didn't mean to be disrespectful; (2) I didn't know it was wrong' . The 
second claim may be understood in two distinct ways: (2a) ignorance of a 
general duty of respect; (2b) ignorance that one 's behaviour manifested 
disrespect. ('I didn't know x was wrong because I didn't know that when I 
did x I would be taken as showing disrespect' .) I have two chief 
contentions here: 
1. For reasons analogous to those outlined above, (2b) is not plausible: it is 
not likely that a morally responsible agent-one to whom moral 
judgements are apt-could fail to know that he had a general duty of 
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respect. It seems to be a fact about human beings that we do think that 
certain individuals are worthy of respect and honour. 19 
2. However, in my OpInIOn, (\) is conceivable, and the reason it is 
conceivable is because (2b) is conceivable. Why is (2b) conceivable? I 
suggest, simply because there are no determinate patterns of behaviour 
that constitute a duty of respect. By this I mean the following: When our 
Hittite sets out to beats his slaves, he either thinks he is justified, or he 
thinks it is wrong but doesn't care. On the other hand, when I keep my 
hat on in a church, I may, plausibly be thought to not know that this form 
of behaviour may be taken to manifest disrespect.2o Thus, whereas if I 
intentionally set about causing physical injU1y, I must know what I am 
doing, and I must think it is justified or wrong. However, when I omitted 
to remove my hat, I didn't realise that this was wrong at all; but neither 
did I think it was justified. 
This suggests a strong disanalogy between negative duties and other 
moral rules. Negative duties say that one must not bring about certain 
physical (perhaps psychological) injuries. But this means that there are 
determinate forms of behaviour specified by the concept, such that the 
agent will only have succeeded in (say) torturing, only if he has brought 
about physical, emotional, and psychological suffering. Therefore, if he is 
not an intentional wrongdoer, he must think what he is doing is 
permissible in this context. 
On the other hand, there is no determinate pattern of behaviour that 
might be regarded as being 'respectful' or 'disrespectful'. A duty of (e.g.) 
respect is realisable in ways that are not conceptually tied to the duty, 
where this means that certain acts and forms of behaviour will be taken to 
19 Once again, see Taylor ( 1989) on this poim. 
20 (It is im portant to note that 1 am not claiming I will have succeeded in being d isrespectful. Perhaps being 
disrespectful drus require some improper intention; in any event I have not established th is claim, yet; this is 
one of my aims in Chapter 4) 
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bear on the question of whether this duty has been violated or complied 
with, which may not have any intimate connection with any particular 
form of behaviour. Indeed, the duty ofrespect is culture specific, such that 
what will count as showing respect in one culture or community might 
differ in another. Instantiations of a duty of respect will be determined by 
a community of people whose practices generate a certain code of 
conduct. In this way, a duty of respect might be linked to certain codes of 
etiquette, a point Wallace (1998) acknowledges as follows: 
Some ... breaches of etiquette will be resented because they violate a 
distinctively moral obligation of respect or consideration (p. 37) 
For these reasons, I suggest, moral ignorance as an excuse emerges in the 
context of a class of actions and set of duties, involving such requirements 
as 'mutual respect' (Rawls 1972), and various role-acquired duties such as 
parental duties, or duties of office or station. A parent has a duty to care 
for her children; a doctor has a duty to care for her patients, and so on. In 
each case, the forms of behaviour that are required of the agent are 
prescribed by the role, but even within a single role, these will take on 
very different shapes and forms. For this reason, a mother's statement: 'I 
didn't mean not to properly care for your educational needs; I didn't 
know x was required' seems to make perfect sense. It is compatible with a 
mother's knowing that she had a duty to care for her children that she 
fails to know that she ought to consider certain aspects of their education. 
Similarly, it is compatible with someone's knowing that he has a duty of 
respect that he fail to know that he should perform, or not perform, 
certain actions. The distinctive feature of this type of obligation is that 
there is not any determinate pattern of behaviour-concerning say, 
physical injury- binding the duty together. This seems to open up a gap 
between knowing that one has a duty and performing certain acts without 
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knowing that they are incompatible with meeting it. That is, one may fail 
to show respect without thinking that one was justified in not showing 
respect. In this sort of case then, moral ignorance renders the act of 
showing disrespect unintentional, and yet, this moral ignorance might 
itself be culpable. 21 
Consider another example to illustrate moral ignorance of this type: let 
us imagine that a certain form of behaviour, say looking at an elderly 
person face-on when conversing is considered highly disrespectful in a 
certain community; and further that everyone agrees that we have some 
sort of duty to be respectful where we can. Now imagine that a traveller in 
this foreign land-call her Cooper-addresses a village elder in this 
impermissible manner, eliciting the indignation of the villagers. Cooper 
should, I think, be excused fro m blame- assuming for the moment that she 
was not negligent-because of her ignorance that this form of behaviour is 
considered disrespectful. She intends to speak to the elderly villager , and 
does not believe that this is a morally bad action. However, on account of 
her ignorance, she unintentionally does something that is considered 
morally wrong and ends up showing disrespect. 
Because the way the duty is realised in not conceptually tied to any sort 
of action (as it is with a duty not to cause injury), when Cooper intends to 
speak to the village-elder, she does not believe this is justified in the 
circumstances, for she has no reason to think it might be inappropriate, 
and hence (perhaps) in need of justification. Thus, although Cooper 
shares a moral principle of mutual respect with the villagers, she does not 
know how to comply with this principle in the circumstances. 
This then is how to understand moral ignorance when it functions as an 
excuse such that the agent unintentionally fails to realise a duty. Moral 
ignorance of a general rule will serve as an excuse only in the context of 
being ignorant of how a certain kind of duty is fulfilled. For the way in 
21 I explore the analogy and distinctive features of these types of duties in Chapter 3. 
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which this type of duty is fulfilled is not conceptually linked to any specific 
forms of behaviour, but may be instantiated in many contingently 
disparate ways. This allows for the possibility that someone may be 
ignorant of what is required to fulfil the moral obligation, and yet will not 
necessari ly think that his actions are justified. 
2.2.3 Culpable Moral Ignorance 
I argued in the previous section that moral ignorance may serve as an 
excuse-i.e. render the action an unintentional violation of a moral 
demand- when the agent is ignorant of the detail of how a (certain type) 
moral demand might be fulfilled. This will be a moral demand that does 
not have any intrinsic relation to specific forms of behaviour. On some 
occasions, this type of moral ignorance will serve successfully in an excuse, 
but as with factual ignorance, an act done out of moral ignorance might be 
culpable if the agent was negligent or careless so that he ought not to have 
been ignorant; that is, a circumstance when he should have known that he 
would be violating a moral demand in doing as he did. In this respect, 
since the infraction is involuntary and yet blameworthy, the proponent of 
PVC is again committed to employing the Tracing Principle to explain 
cases of culpable moral ignorance. 
To illustrate how the Tracing Principle would be put to work in the 
present context of moral ignorance, imagine that Cooper was negligent in 
not finding out about the moral codes of the culture she was visiting. T he 
strategy here is clear: although she acted in ignorance and inadvertently 
caused offence, she is to blame insofar as being a traveller commits one to 
learning about the moral customs peculiar to the people she is visiting. 
She is culpable for not taking the steps to ensure that she would meet the 
moral demand for respect. 
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However, as with factual ignorance, I have doubts as to whether the 
Tracing Principle can adequately account for all cases of culpable moral 
ignorance. But I leave this argument for Chapter 4 
2.3 Conclusion 
In this Chapter I explored the excuse of ignorance-both moral and 
factual- investigating when the ignorance serves to get the agent off the 
hook, and when it does not, i.e . when it is culpable. I have done this in the 
context of showing how PVC must be extended to allow for cases of 
culpable ignorance. The basic idea here (to which a defender of PVC is 
committed) is that culpable ignorance is to be understood as being 
consequent on prior culpable and voluntary acts and omissions. Taking 
this thesis-the Tracing Principle-into consideration, PVC is amended as 
follows: 
(PVC*) For any bad act x, A is blameworthy for x only if (1) A 
voluntarily consented to x, or (2) A's doing x is traceable to earlier 
bad acts which A voluntarily consented to doing. 
In Chapter 4, I argue that PVC* cannot accommodate all cases of culpable 
Ignorance. 
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3. Emotions and Obligations 
The aim of this dissertation is show that the Principle of Voluntary 
Consent is false. In Chapter 4, my strategy unfolds in two distinct stages. 
In the first place, I show that there to be a substantial number examples-
cases of culpable ignorance and negligence-in which persons are held 
morally responsible or blamed for transgressions that are in no way related 
to their voluntary choices. In the second stage, I argue that these agents 
ought to be blamed because they have violated moral obligations: they are 
blameworthy. 
It should therefore be clear that much of my argumentation In 
Chapter 4 depends on having articulate concepts of moral responsibility, 
blame and blameworthiness. However, these concepts are often used in 
many different contexts, in connection with quite different forms of 
personal and ethical assessments, including assessment of character, 
beliefs, motivations and emotions.' For this reason, I devote this chapter 
to clarifying the concepts of moral responsibility, blame and 
blameworthiness. 
I do this as follows: first, I outline one common conception of blame 
and show why it is inadequate. I thereafter present Jay Wallace's theory of 
moral responsibility, an account which, as it seems to me, is very helpful in 
illuminating and clarifying some of the most crucial elements of the 
concepts of moral responsibility and blame. 
1 Compare Robert Adams (1985): The following reproaches dearly express blame for involuntary Slates; yet 
each would be appropriate, and deserved in some circumstance:o; . You don't really feel sorry for what you've 
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3.1 Blame: The Vice Theory 
In Responsibility and the Limits of Evil, Gary Watson considers the following 
common conception of blame (1987, p. 124): 
To blame someone morally for something is to attribute it to a moral 
fault or shortcoming, or defect of character, vice, and similarly for 
praise. Responsibility could be constructed in terms of the propriety 
conditions of such judgements: that is , judgements to the effect that an 
action or attitude manifests a virtue or vice (Watson (1987, p. 124)).2 
This account is inadequate for three important reasons: 
1. The first is noted by Watson (1987): this notion of blame leaves out the 
special force of what we are doing when we are blaming someone. This is 
precisely what Strawson wants to avoid-that blaming could be done from 
the 'objective' attitude-in his reactive theory. 'It is as though in blaming 
we were mainly moral clerks, recording moral faults for whatever 
purposes' (p. 125). 
2. The above theory says that persons are properly blamed for their 
actions and attitudes when these are attributable to faults in their 
character, or vices. But this is to neglect the large disparity between the 
kinds of faults we are prone to have. Vices and flaws of character come in a 
motley assortment, including being cruel, deceitful, cold-hearted, 
irritating, arrogant and tactless. However, the latter surely have little to do 
with moral responsibility. At the very least, a distinction needs to be made 
between those actions or attitudes reflecting vices bound up with wrong 
action and those that pertain to merely ethically disagreeable forms of 
done! It really hurts my feelings that you don't feci anyth ing about what I am going through. It is arrogant of 
you to think that you have a right (0 do that (p. 23). 
2 Watson attributes this view to Nozick, Milo and James Wallace. 
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behaviour. Another way of saying this is that some vICes pertain to 
violations of duty, while others are aligned to the concept of 'good'. 
3. Thirdly, one may be blamed for an action that is quite out of keeping 
with one's general dispositions. People can be blamed for 'spontaneous 
acts whose motives are extinguished after the deed is done' (Wallace 1998, 
p. 123). Blame is a response to wrongdoing; it is not then necessary that 
the character who did wrong be habitually disposed to these varieties of 
behaviour. 
In my view Jay Wallace's reactive theory of moral responsibility does not 
suffer from any of these deficiencies. Indeed, I regard it as illuminating 
often murky concepts in some novel ways. I outline his theory in some 
detail below. 
3.2 Wallace on Responsibility 
Wallace's point of departure is P.F. Strawson's (1982) suggestion that 
responsibility must be understood in the context of the 'reactive 
sentiments'; when we treat an agent as morally responsible for an action 
we respond to that person with a range of moral reactive sentiments. 
However, on Strawson's view, the reactive attitudes are broadly construed 
as the 'non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved in 
transactions with each other (Wallace 1998, pp. 27-28); to this class belong 
sentiments as varied as resentment, gratitude, love, forgiveness, guilt, and 
hurt feelings. 
For Wallace, this conception of the reactive attitudes is simply too 
broad to properly delineate the sentiments are peculiar to moral 
responsibility. For what does love or hurt feelings have to do with moral 
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responsibility or blame? He therefore argues that a narrow construal of 
the reactive emotions as primarily those of resentment, indignation and 
guilt. This move is merited for two independent reasons . 
Firstly, it allows preservation of Strawson's insight that the reactive 
attitudes provide the key to understanding moral responsibility, while 
avoiding the consequence that attitudes such as love and hurt feelings, 
shame, and embarrassment may also be relevant here. 3 Secondly, it 
permits us to see how the reactive attitudes 'hang together as a class', 
because resentment, indignation and guilt are dis' 'nguished from other 
personal sentiments in an important way. 
On this second point, Wallace persuasively argues that the reactive 
sentiments of resentment, indignation and guilt are distinguishable from 
other 'personal attitudes', by being constitutively bound up with the 
expectations we hold people to. More specifically, we cannot understand 
these emotions without invoking the idea of holding persons to demands 
or expectations (Wallace 1998, p. 21)4 Resentment, indignation and guilt 
have an important cognitive dimension-a propositional object-so that 
there is something that one is guilty, resentful or indignant about. 
Furthermore, if I feel resentful because you did not respect my wishes, 
then the belief that you didn't respect my wishes-the demand that has not 
been met- both explains why I am in that emotional state, and specifies the 
content of that state. The explanation of the reactive emotion will always 
make reference to a belief that an expectation has not been complied with 
(Wallace 1998, p . 21). This is not so with other attitudes such as love, 
gratitude and embarrassment, which do not have any (close) connection 
with expectations. 
3 Wallace adopts the term 'personal auitude' to denme mese sentiments which we are naturally inclined to 
adopt toward other people (Wallace 1998, pp . 25-33). 
4 The terms 'demand' and 'expectation' will be used interchangeably throughout. 
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However, it is noteworthy that distinguishing the class of reactive 
emotions through their connections with expectations does not provide a 
reductive analysis of the reactive attitudes (cf. Wallace 1998, p. 27). For 
the notion of an expectation (or holding someone to an expectation) is 
itself to be explicated in terms of being subject to the reactive attitudes 
(pp. 26-27). Therefore, holding someone to an expectation is not 
independent or prior to susceptibility to the reactive sentiments. However, 
beliefs as to the violation of a demand do have a priority in the sense that 
'particular states of reactive emotion must always be explicable in terms of 
some belief concerning the violation of a demand' (p. 24); the belief about 
the violation of a demand confers the emotion with a propositional object. 
This connection between the reactive attitudes and expectations may be 
described as a 'quasi-evaluational' stance of 'holding someone to an 
expectation'. More specifically, as a disjunction, inclusively understood: A 
holds B to an expectation (x) only if (1) A is susceptible to a certain range 
of emotions if expectation x is not met, or (2) A believes that it would be 
appropriate to feel those emotions if x is not met (Wallace 1998, p. 23). 
The first disjunct specifies that responding to someone with the reactive 
emotions when he did not meet a demand is sufficient for holding him to 
the expectation that he meet that demand. Thus, if a man or woman 
responds to another person with the reactive emotions, then he or she 
holds that person to some or other expectation. The second disjunct, 
allows for the possibility that someOne may believe a demand has been 
violated, but not actually feel any emotion; in this case, Wallace claims, it 
is sufficient that he believe that the reactive emotions would be 
appropriate ('I ought to resent you, but I don't'). Holding someone to an 
expeL,ation need not then imply the actual application of the reactive 
attitude: what is crucial is that the agent be an apt candidate for 
expressions of these 'retributive sentiments' on that occasion. (The stance 
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of holding someone to an expectation is still explicated in terms of the 
reactive emotions; the reactive emotions are required to make sense of the 
idea of 'holding to a demand'.) Indeed, if neither of these conditions is 
met and the disjunction is falsified, no one is being held to any demand. 
However, this 'quasi-evaluationa!' stance of holding someone to a 
demand does not yet isolate the sphere of moral responsibility . Nothing in 
the idea of holding someone to an expectation dictates that it is to be 
restricted to moral concerns, for it is plain that we may hold each other to 
demands that are not in any sense 'mora!'. For exampll, I might demand 
that you bring my tea at three o'clock every afternoon, being prone to 
indignation when you forget. Or, I may feel guilty for wasting my time 
watching television instead of concentrating on the work that I believe I 
ought to be doing. 5 These occasions of proneness to the reactive 
sentiments have no interesting connection with moral responsibility. 
In order to distinguish between the stance of holding someone to a 
non-moral demand from holding him to a moral demand, Wallace 
suggests that the moral reactive emotions are distinguished by the nature 
of the beliefs that explain them (1998, p. 36). The emotion in question is 
moral if the belief that an expectation has been violated is a belief about a 
moral expectation or demand. In this respect, the 'moral reactive 
attitudes' are those explained by beliefs concerning the violations of 
obligations understood as 'strict prohibitions and requirements' (p. 37).6 
3.2.1 On Holding Someone Morally Responsible 
As one might anticipate, Wallace's account of the stance of holding a 
person morally responsible draws upon on the notion of holding a person 
5 The example is Gabriele Taylor's (1985). 
6 I will explain these notions in more detail in Section 1.3. 
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to a demand. (As already remarked, Wallace understands the stance of 
holding someone to a demand or expectation in terms of a susceptibility 
to the reactive emotions.) So the framework is now in place: to hold a 
person morally responsible is to hold the person to the moral obligations that 
one accepts. We hold persons morally responsible only if we hold them to 
moral obligations. And since the stance of holding someone to an 
obligation is essentially a matter of being susceptible to the reactive 
emotions, the stance of holding him responsible is a matter of 
susceptibility to the (moral) reactive emotions (Wallace 1998, p. 62-63). 
Therefore, to hold someone morally responsible is to (1) be susceptible 
to a certain range of moral reactive emotions (explained by a belief about 
a moral obligation), or, (2) to believe that these sentiments would be 
appropriate, or (3) to feel the reactive emotions in question and to believe 
that they are appropriate.7 However, one final amendment need to be 
made to eliminate cases of irrational reactive emotions, notably 'irrational 
guilt', in which the agent feels the reactive emotion but disavows it by 
believing that he ought not to feel as he does. This would be unacceptable 
for an account of holding someone morally responsible, since it would imply 
that the agent is holding someone responsible for something he does not 
believe is required of that person. T aking these considerations into 
account, Wallace supplements his theory with the condition that the agent 
must really accept the moral obligation, that is, be prepared to ofIer some 
justification for the obligation in question8 
7 A question that might be raised here is that if the second disjunct- believing that it would be appropriate to 
adopt the reactive attitudes-is sufficient for holding someone morally responsible, then aren't those beliefs 
fundamental to the stance? (This is Scanlon's (l988) criticism of Straws on's position in Freedom and Resentment .) 
Wallace respol .JS: 'the reactive emotions are needed to explain [the] attitudinal aspect of [rue moral blame. 
and its natural connection with sanctioning behaviour' (1998, p. 78). The idea here is that without reference to 
the reactive emotions the 'special force of moral blame' will be lost, since beliefs about violations of moral 
demand would amount to a 'mere description' of the situation. I find this response plausible (cf. Scanlon (1988, 
1998», but this is not crucial to my later argument; what will be important is the connection between one's 
'proneness' to these emotions and blaming. 
8 For more on the notion of acceptance, see Wallace (l998. pp. 40-50). 
48 
II 
I 
i l 
I 
I 
Emotion and Obligations Chapter 3 
It should be clear that the language of 'holding someone responsible' is 
naturally cast into the language of 'blaming' and 'blameworthiness'. To 
regard a person as deserving of blame, or blameworthy, does not require 
that one actually blame (or sanction) him. However, if I count a person 
blameworthy then I will deem certain responses as appropriate. On the 
other hand, when I blame myself, I will feel guilt and remorse, and when I 
blame another, resentment and indignation. In this respect, to blame a 
person is actually to feel the force of the reactive emotions toward that 
person. 
This completes the Wallace's account of the stance of holding a person 
morally responsible or counting him as blameworthy. However, to 
anticipate an objection, there is surely a difference between being held 
morally responsible and actually being responsible. What is the connection? 
Wallace interprets the latter normatively: 
(N) S is morally responsible (for action x) if and only if it would be 
appropriate to hold S morally responsible (for action x) (1998, p. 
91). 
More specifically, the conditions for appropriateness are to be explicated 
in terms of the moral norms of fairness and reasonableness (Wallace 1998, 
pp. 106-107). Norms of reasonableness relate to questions of whether an 
agent is a fitting recipient of moral judgments, that is, pertain to questions 
of responsible agency;9 since I am not concerned with this issue, I restrict 
attention to 'appropriateness as fairness' . Another more familiar way of 
formulating N is that: 
(N") A is morally blameworthy for x just in case it is fair to blame A for 
x. 
9 By this I mean whether or nOt {he agent is, generally speak in g, an apt cand idate for moral appraisal. 
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Since blame is understood in terms of the reactive sentiments, this 
translates as the claim that it would be fair to feel resentment, indignation 
or guilt. But then how is fairness here to be understood? When is it 
appropriate to feel the reactive emotions constitutive of moral blame? As 
already noted, Wallace claims that the reactive emotions are moral only 
when the belief that explains the emotion is a belief about the violation of 
a moral obligation (Wallace 1998, p. 133). But this means that moral 
blame-i.e. resentment, indignation and guilt-is fair only when the agent 
really has violated a moral obligation. This is what Wallace calls a 
'fundamental principle of desert, 'an abstract moral conviction in which 
reflective moral judges have the highest confidence' (1998, p. 135): no 
one deserves to be blamed if he has not in fact done anything wrong, or 
more specifically, no one deserves to be blamed if he has not violated a 
moral obligation (this is what I call PB, in Chapter 1). There are two 
important questions that remained to be answered: (I) when can someone 
be said to have violated a moral obligation? (2) What is one morally 
obligated to do? 
With respect to the first question, I have already explained, in 
Chapter I, that Wallace is committed to VM, the claim that a moral 
obligation can only be violated through a culpable choice. VM is therefore 
an account of what it takes to violate a moral obligation. On Wallace's 
account, moral blame is unfair unless the agent has violated a moral 
obligation by expressing a culpable choice. In Chapter 4, I resist this last 
inference, from the notion of violation of moral obligation to the notion of 
a culpable choice, that is, the idea that a moral obligation can only be 
violated voluntarily. On the other hand, since moral blame is due only 
when someone has violated a moral obligation (PB), it is a strongpoint of 
Wallace's theory that his notion of responsibility makes explicit this 
connection between the blame and moral obligation, through beliefs 
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explaining the moral reactive emotions. Moral reactive emotions are fair 
only when the agent really has done something morally wrong by violating 
an obligation. 
However-the second question-this is not yet to say how the content 
of moral obligations is to be defined. We have a theory of what it takes to 
violate a moral obligation (VM), but we do not yet know what we are 
obliged to do. For not all ethically relevant forms of behaviour are 
pertinent to the concept of right. For example, someone is hardly 
violating a duty if she decides not to donate all her money to charity. The 
aim of the next section is to gain a better understanding of the content of 
moral obligations. 
3.2.2 Moral Obligations 
Wallace argues that a reactive emotion IS moral if and only if it is 
constitutively bound up with moral reasons supported by moral 
justifications. He refers to the expectations that allow of such moral 
justification as obligations (Wallace 1998, p. 36), or the class of distinctively 
moral prohibitions or requirements (p. 63). This sphere of the ethical 
accords with what Rawls (1972) calls the 'concept of right' or in Scanlon's 
(1998) evocative phrase, 'what we owe to each other'. 
To see the distinction between the space of moral obligation and other 
ethical concepts, note that concept of right is broader than the concept of 
justice, because some moral obligations prohibit actions that are not 
specifically matters of justice; for example, an obligation against cruelty 
(Wallace 1998, p. 63). On the other hand there is also the sphere of the 
supererogatory action, including as it does acts that are ethically relevant, 
but not strictly required of us. Compare Bernard Williams (1985): 
There are actions that are either more or less than obligations. They 
may be heroic or very fine actions, which go what is obligatory or 
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demanded. Or they may be actions that from an ethical point of view it 
would be agreeable or worthwhile or a good idea to do, without one's 
being required to do them (p. 181). 
In addition, there are also other ethical modalities of value such as various 
traits of character that we value in others, and some more that we 
disapprove of. These too are situated outside of the concept of 'right' . 
Furthermore, according to Wallace (1998), these other 'modalities of 
moral value' (p. 38) correspond to a different set of moral sentiments, 
distinct from the moral reactive attitudes in terms of which the concept of 
blaming is essentially defined. The moral reactive emotions are explained 
by the belief that a moral obligation has been violated' (p. 37), whereas 
other moral beliefs concerning acts of beneficence, or kindness may elicit 
sentiments such as gratitude and admiration. Moreover, sometimes the 
moral reactive emotions may even coincide with other moral emotions: 
recall Rawls' (1972) example of the man who cheats and feels both shame 
and guilt: guilt because he has wronged others by selfishly advancing his 
OWn interests, and shame because he has shown himself to be unworthy of 
the trust of his associates (p. 445). However, the key difference between 
moral resentment, indignation and guilt and other moral sentiments is 
that they are necessarily explained by beliefs concerning the violation of 
strict prohibitions and requirements. 
We have now distinguished between the concept of right and the 
other modalities of moral value. However, what sort of things are 'strict 
prohibitions and requirements, and how are these acquired?' Drawing On 
Rawls (1972) I propose the following taxonomy: (1) 'acquired' as opposed 
to 'natural' duties; (2) positive vs. negative duties. These distinctions will 
be very important to my arguments in Chapter 4. I therefore spend some 
time explaining them below. 
Acquired duties are those obligations acquired through contracts and 
promises and covenants. These are essentially defined by an agreement, 
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institution or practice, the rules of which specifY what it is that one is 
required to do': these assume that we have, in some sense, 'taken them on 
by voluntarily (cf. Rawls 1972, p. 113).10 Moreover, the concept of right 
also incorporates what Rawls' labels natural duties- the class of duties that 
'apply to us without regard to our voluntary acts '. Natural duties are 
incumbent on us as human agents and are not voluntarily acquired 
through participation in any practice. Natural duties include the duty 'not 
to injure', the duty 'not to harm the innocent' (Rawls 1972 p . 109), the 
'duty to help one another' (p.114, p. 338), the duty to 'uphold justice', and 
a duty of mutual respect (p. 337). 
Related to both aforementioned categories are duties or 
responsibilities acquired in virtue of occupying a distinct role or station 
(ef. Hart 1968, pp. 212-214). Such duties include a general's duties to 
protect and preserve his army, a mother's duty to care for her children, 
and a lifeguard's duty to monitor and ensure the safety of swimmers. 
These duties may be voluntarily acquired, as when a doctor pledges an 
oath to care for her patients , or they may be obtained simply by having a 
certain relation to others as for example, a mother's duty to her children, 
and sons and daughters' duties to their parents. 
In my opinion these latter duties relate III an interesting way to 
Rawls' notion of positive duties (Rawls, 1972, p. 114). According to Rawls, 
the intuitive difference between positive and negative duties resides in 
that positive duties require us to do 'good for another' (p. 114), while 
negative duties prohibit us from doing something morally bad. In this 
sense the duties to, uphold justice, render mutual aid, and give mutual 
respect, require positive effort on our part to do good for others. 
However, as Rawls (1972, p. 114) himself notes, the distinction between 
positive and negative duties often collapses, since doing good to another 
10 Rawls reserves the term 'obligation' for voluntarily acquired duties. 
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will, of course, entail not doing bad. For this reason, for example, the duty 
of mutual respect will also involve not showing disrespect to other 
persons I 1 
However, it seems to me nonetheless, that there is another way of 
understanding the notion of a positive duty that gives it a more robust and 
useful formulation. This is through a link with the idea of a role 
requirement. 12 As I will understand the term 'positive duty', it has a 
relation to the concept of looking out for, caring, and preserving the 
interests of those covered by a role-requirement. As Hart (1968, p. 213) 
notes: '[role-responsibilities] are duties of a relatively complex or 
extended kind, defining a .. sphere of responsibility" requiring care and 
attention over a protracted period of time.' Consider the requirement that 
parents care for their families. A parent must exercise a great deal of 
effort in order to actually fulfil this duty: caring for his or her family calls 
for great attention to the many different aspects (material, emotional and 
physical) in which this duty might be realised. Indeed, a duty to care for 
one's family-though equally definable as a duty not to fail to care for one's 
family-requires only that one fail to measure up. Whether this kind of 
failure is explicable in terms of an agent's culpable choices is something I 
will discuss in Chapter 4, but for now, note that a failure to comply with 
this type of duty requires only a lack of assiduousness on the part of the 
agent, and not any active effort to do wrong. When a parent fails to do 
good for her family, and fails to ensure a reasonable degree of flourishing, 
she has failed to fulfil her duty . She may fail to realise her duty in many 
different ways contingent upon many of the particular details of the 
circumstance. 
II In my view the word prohibition C'dptures best the sense of a negative dmy. while a requirement is most 
perspicuously employed in the COnlex( of a positive duty; but I will nOt insist on this. 
12 I here depart from Rawls' (1972) understanding of the difference between positive and negative duties. 
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By construing the notion of positive duties in terms of duties that (i) are 
extended over time, (ii) complex, and (iii) require a high level of 
diligence, I suggest that we can include at the outer limit, the duties of 
mutual respect and justice. We may say that these are role-acquired 
duties-in virtue of membership of a community-and that they last an 
entire lifetime, involving many different facets and requiring much 
attention to measure up to. 
Furthermore, the class of duties which Rawls' calls negative duties-not 
to injure, not to inflict unnecessary suffering, and so on-are distinguished 
from positive duties in an important way. For, in fact, these require a great 
deal of effort in order to violate them. The duty not to be cruel implies 
that one ought not to cause suffering to another, but the act of causing 
suffering actually requires a great deal of care and sensitivity: 13 substantial 
effort is necessarily required to violate the duty. Of course, one may 
unintentionally cause harm, but this would not constitute a violation of 
that type of duty. As Wallace correctly notes, to violate the duty of 
non maleficence requires that one act in ways that express the choice to 
harm other people (1998, p. 128). This entails active effort. Furthermore, 
we might say that negative duties are 'linear duties': there is some 
straightforward specification of what violation of the duty will entail. 
Should someone actively set out to inflict suffering on another individual, 
and succeed, then he will have acted in a cruel manner. 14 Nothing less 
than physical or psychological injury will here constitute a violation of the 
duty. On the other hand, with a duty to respect, or care for one's family, 
there are a multitude of different forms of behaviour which constitute 
failures to meet the duty. 
13 As Nietzsche remarked, cruelty contrasts with brutality in that it has to share, rather than lack, the sensitivity 
to others' suffering that is displayed by kindness (Rolll12dg€ Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, p. 629). 
14 I will also use the term 'linear duties' to denote well specified contractual Iype duties. In this respect, 
negative duties are only one lype of 'linear dury'. 
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In summary, let me offer the following taxonomy of the space of right, 
the space in which the concept of moral responsibility belongs. The duties 
which bind an agent may be natural or acquired obligations. Furthermore, 
they may be positive of negative. Positive duties, in my sense, are duties 
which are characterised by temporal extension, complexity, and requiring 
a high degree of diligence for compliance. On the other hand, negative 
duties are marked by their relation to physical (or psychological) injury, 
and are linear because of this relation. Furthermore, they are duties which 
demand much effort to violate. 
For later argument, I am most interested in the set of positive duties, 
perhaps especially those naturally acquired; included in this category are 
duties of 'mutual respect', 'mutual aid', and the duty to uphold justice; 
along with many disparate role·define duties l5 
3.3 Conclusion 
Three distinct strands have emerged from this attempted clarification of 
the concepts of moral responsibility and blame. (I) The relation between 
the moral reactive emotions and moral obligations. (2) The relation 
between moral obligation and blame. (3) The difference between positive 
and negative duties . 
In Chapter 4 I demonstrate that PVC cannot be sustained once we 
have clarity on these distinctive features of blame and responsibility. 
15 One objection that might be raised againSl this conception of blame. with its reliance on an artirulate notion 
of obligation is that there has been deep disagreement between (say) Utilitarians and Deontologists on how 
these duties are generated. Thus it migh t be thought that the content of obligations will differ substantially 
according LO which high-order principle (e.g. 'Utility') onc subscribes to. Any notion of blame dependent on 
the outcome of these long-debated issues is therefore liable to be 'unsteady' (meaning that it may be the aclS 
that are deemed blameworthy might be substantially altered, depending on the outcome of these higher·order 
ethical debates. A way to bypass this issue is, following Wa llace (1998, p. 112), to anchor one's moral principles 
in our considered convictions: in this respect. it seems to me that any higher.order principle must coincide with 
certain fundamenta l prohibitions and requirements against (say) inflicting injury. In ,his regard. Rawl s' 
taxonomy outlined in the text above seems to capture many of our most central concerns about 'what we owe to 
each other'. 
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4. Involuntary Action, Consideration and Blame 
In this Chapter I argue against the Principle of Voluntary Consent. To 
begin the argument I present some examples in which, I contend, 
someone is held morally responsible for an involuntary action or actions, and 
further, that these actions are not traceable to prior culpable voluntary 
consent. This exercise is conducted in the context of Wallace's argument 
for PVC, which I outlined in Chapter 1. As emphasised throughout, this 
argument relies on the premises VM and PB. Since I accept PB-moral 
blame is due only when someone has violated a moral obligation-to cast 
doubt on PVC' is to call VM into question. One important point that I will 
repeatedly mention, is that when our intuitions do not coincide with 
PVC', they are also at odds with VM. 
Once I have established that these instance of culpable ignorance 
cannot be explained by PVC', I turn to the question of whether our moral 
intuitions are in need of revision, or whether PVC' should be rejected. It 
is important to keep in mind that PVC' is a normative principle 
purporting to allocate fair blame. Thus, it does not follow from there 
being certain practices in which we blame persons for actions not 
conforming to PVC', that PVC' is false; it might very well be that those 
practices are somehow unfair, and in need of revision. This raises 
important issues concerning methodology, and the relation between 
normative principles and our 'considered judgements'. I I say more about 
this in Section 4.6 with reference to the method of 'reflective equilibrium' 
(Rawls, 1972). However, to anticipate somewhat, I will argue that the 
implications of revising our moral intuitions to coincide with PVC' are 
highly counter-intuitive, and that PVC should be rejected. Finally, I 
1 This is Rawls' (1972) term. See pp. 48·5 1, 
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attempt to diagnose the temptation for the principle, and to show its 
relevance in a modified conception of the bounds of responsibility. 
4.1 Against Voluntary Consent 
Consider the following: 
Suppose I have a house with a view of the sea: a view that I have much 
enjoyed over the years. Suppose further that Mason buys the plot in 
front of mine, and builds his house such that it occludes my view, let's 
say, by constructing an unsightly protuberance on the top of his roof. I 
rage in private against Mason, at his inconsiderateness, that he did not 
take my interests into account. 
Let me specify the following three details concerning the example: 
(i) Mason did not think he was justified in constructing his house as he 
did. That is, he not consider his action and (say) conclude that he was 
entitled to build his house as he liked, since it was, after all, his land. (If 
so, he would have acted intentionally; he may then, at best, have acted 
from an unjustified belief) 
(ii) Mason did not think that he would not be occluding my view: he simply 
did not think about it. This eliminates the possibility that he did fulfil his 
duty to consider my interests but made a mistake in the calculation. 
(iii) I do not think that Mason built the house to spite me: I believe that 
Mason was inconsiderate. 
So, why does this example pose a problem for PVC*? 
1. The first point to emphasize is that Mason did not intentionally do 
anything wrong. When he decided to build his house as he did, he did not 
realise that he would be blocking my view. Recalling our definition of an 
intentional action x, it is plain that, at the time of his action , Mason did 
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not have any awareness that his actions might be considered as of a rype x. 
That he was blocking my view and thereby failing to show proper 
consideration was furthest from his mind when he acted. However, it 
seems to me that he should have realised this and that his building his 
house as he did shows a certain lack of regard for me. His fault resides in 
not realising something that he should have realised and in this respect 
implies a degree of negligence or carelessness on his part. 
Mason is ignorant of a factual detail of the situation (that he would be 
blocking my view), but this ignorance is culpable because, so to speak, he 
should have known better. And his being ignorant in this culpable way 
conveys upon his action the moral property of 'inconsiderateness' . He is, 
of course, then also ignorant that his action displays this quality . (In 
factual ignorance the agent does know that an action of that type would be 
impermissible, but does not know that his action is of that type. By 
contrast, with moral ignorance the agent is unaware that an action of the 
type he intends to perform constitutes a violation of a moral dutY.2) 
2. As noted in Chapter 2, a proponent of PVC is committed to the view 
that cases of culpable ignorance can be explained by means of the Tracing 
Principle. However, the problem here is that Mason just did not think 
about his action. It simply never crossed his mind that in acting as he did, 
he might be disregarding my interests. And there is surely no written 
manual which landowners are obliged to read concerning neighbourly 
relations; it is plausible that Mason simply bought the land, and set about 
constructing his house without thinking about the effects upon his 
neighbour. 
The Tracing Principle apparently reqUIres that the agent know both 
what his obligation is and what meeting it requires, such that his 
2 See Section 2.2.2. 
59 
j 
I 
l 
I 
I 
Involuntary Action, Consideration and Blame Chapter 4 
culpability resides in his not having taken proper measures to ensure that 
he would end up fulfilling it. But since the obligation of 'proper 
consideration'-if it is that-which Mason violates is not due to any 
voluntarily acquired contract, and, more importantly, it is one which may 
be violated or complied with in many different ways, there are no specific 
measures that someone can take to ensure that he meets it at all times.3 
To be sure, Mason does know that he has an obligation to consider the 
interests of others, but on this occasion, he quite unintentionally fails to 
realise this duty. 
3. Finally, let me stipulate that I (as the owner of the house) feel indignant 
towards Mason because I believe that he ought to have respected me 
more; ought to have considered my interests. Now, insofar as indignation 
is indicative of moral blame, and the belief that explains the indignation is 
a belief about a duty of 'proper consideration', it seems then that I blame 
Mason. This means that I must think that he has done something wrong. 
There we have, or so I propose, an example that stands at odds with the 
idea that the violation of a moral obligation requires a culpable choice 
(VM). In conflict with PVC', I blame Mason for building his house in my 
view because I think he has done something wrong; his involuntary fault 
resides in his being inconsiderate and not thinking about his neighbour 
when he drew up the plans for his house.4 
It follows that this example stands in conflict with PVC" 
3 In the terminology of Chapter 3, it is a positive duty . See Section.4.3 . 
4 We might also think that Mason has devalued my property by conslIllCling his house in this way. (Thanks to 
Tom Stoneham for this point. ) 
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4.2 The Supererogatory, Character and Blame 
How may this conclusion be averted? I will consider two possible 
responses. 
1. Any demand of considerateness is supererogatory, that is, it is 
something that it would be nice if people did, but they are not to be 
blamed for their failures in this regard. Therefore, even if I do feel 
indignant toward Mason, it would be analogous to my being indignant at 
someone for not conforming to a certain rule of etiquette. Although I 
might feel indignation (or resentment), these emotions do not meet the 
criteria for moral blame since the belief that explains the emotion does 
not correspond to any moral obligation. 
I don't think this is plausible. For it seems to me that we do have a duty 
to look out for the interests of others, and to be considerate. Furthermore, 
this corresponds to some degree with what Rawls calls the natural duty of 
mutual respect (Rawls 1972, p. 337): the duty to respect other persons and 
to try and understand their aims and interests (p. 338). In this respect, 
Wallace himself writes: 
.. . it is much easier to comply with the moral prohibition on murder, 
than with the obligations on kindness or consideration (1998, p. 180). 
The belief that explains my indignation can therefore plausibly be 
deemed a belief about the violation of a moral obligation, suggesting that 
my indignation represents moral blame. 
2. A second response is closely related to the first: according to this reply, 
my reaction and judgement of Mason is not blame, but corresponds to 
another ethical idea, namely that Mason has a selfish or inconsiderate 
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character. Perhaps then. Mason may be 'reprehensible in some other 
way ... · than being morally blameworthy (Zimmerman 1988. p. 116). 
Therefore. my stipulation is wrong. and I would not plausibly feel 
indignation toward Mason. but rather angry. irritated and disappointed-
or one of the many other ethically relevant personal attitudes that do not 
indicate moral blame. but assessment of another kind: assessment of him 
as a certain sort of character. 
To respond to this objection, let us assume that Mason really is a 
singularly inconsiderate character. He has the vice of inconsiderateness. 
Following Nagel we may understand vices as 
... states of character that influence choice. but are certainly not 
exhausted by dispositions to act deliberately in certain ways. A person 
may be greedy. envious. cowardly. cold. ungenerous. unkind, vain or 
conceited, but behave perfectly by a monumental effort of will. To 
possess these vices is to be unable to help having certain feelings under 
certain circumstances, and to have strong spontaneous impulses to act 
badly. Even if one controls the impulses, one still has the vice (Nagel 
1979.p.181). 
However, as Scanlon (1998) points out, this account requires a clarification 
in that vices are not spontaneous impulses to act badly. but 'tendencies to see 
certain considerations as reasons for acting in certain ways' (p. 273). 
To illustrate, someone who is greedy, places (say) an undue emphasis in 
his acquiring certain assets. such that his reasoning process is weighted by 
the importance he places on these ends. However. as Nagel notes, a 
greedy person may know that he is greedy. and not actually want to be 
that way. Furthermore. he may. by virtue of some 'monumental effort of 
will', act perfectly well. But this suggests that there may be two forms of 
assessment relevant on that occasion. It is to his credit that he restrained 
himself and acted in an exemplary fashion, but he would still be a better 
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person if he did not have the vice.; To be sure, he acted blamelessly, but 
he is still a greedy person. 
However, the vices of inconsiderateness and selfishness differ from (say) 
greediness in that the inconsiderate person is typically unaware that he 
has the vice. In my view there are number of similar 'vices of ignorance',6 
such that a degree of negligence or carelessness is constitutive of the vice.7 
For a person with this kind of vice may act in ways that do not give proper 
heed to others without even realising that he is doing this; this tendency 
not to properly consider other people's interests is what constitutes the 
vice. In this respect, being inconsiderate or selfish entails being negligent, 
in that the inconsiderate person does not 'look out' for the interests of 
others. The visual metaphor captures the idea that the agent fails to do his 
duty to 'look'-make checks-to see that whether and how his behaviour is 
affecting others. 
:; See Scanlon 1998, p. 274. 
6 I mentioned selfishness and inconsiderateness; to this list may be added ingratirnde and arrogance. The term 
'vices of ignorance' is meant (0 mirror Julia Driver's (1989) 'virtues of ignorance'. 
7 Consider this passage from Dickens' Martin Chuzzlcwi t: 
Martin's nature was a frank and generous one; but he had been bred up in his Grandfather's house; and it will 
usually be found that the meaner domestic vices propagate themselves to be their own amagon isls. Selfishness 
does this especially: so do suspicion, cun ning stealth, and covetous propensities. Manin had unconsciously 
reasoned as a child, 'My guardian takes so much thought of himself, that unless I do the like by myself, I shall 
be forgotten.' So he had grown selfish. 
But he had never known it. If anyone had taxed him with the vice. he would have indignantly repelled the 
accusation. and conceived himself unworthily aspersed (p. 449). 
This passage illustrates two important points concerning the vice of selfishness. I. Martin has never known that 
people considered him to be selfish; thus someone may entirely oblivious to the fact that his actions are 
regarded as selfish . 2. If someone had 'taxed him with the vice' , he would have. after the fact, justified his 
actions as being ones that he was entitled 10. 
More generally. a selfish, inconsiderate or ungrateful person may fall into MO categories: (l) He may be 
someone who is mistakenly believes his actions are justified, o r (2) someone who does not realise that his 
actions have the eITeCis that they do. In the firs t category, he may believe that he is entitled to certain activities. 
when he is not. and it is these beliefs about his entitlements that actually constitute his selfishness. Or in the 
case that presently interests me, in the case of vices in the second category, someone may be quite unaware that 
his actions have the effects that they do. Since it is only in this lauer category that the agent acts 
unintemionally. and thus becomes a candidate fo r an excuse. I restrict my attention to thi s class. 
It is possib le that someone may declare outright that he knows thal he is selfish, and thinks thallhis is justified, 
or does not really care. Whatever we make of this, however, it does not imply that he knows when he is acting in 
a way that might be thought selfish. This suggests that even in this kind of case, selfish actions will nOI be 
entirely subsumed under the class of actions from an unjustified belief. See Section 2.6. (Thanks CO Veli Mitova 
for bringing this passage from Dickens to my ancn(ion.) 
63 
i. 
" 
• 
Involuntary Action, Consideration and Blame Chapter 4 
On a given occasIOn of inconsiderateness-an inconsiderate action-it 
seems to me that there are two forms of assessment relevant. As in the case 
of greed, sometimes the appraisal of action and of character may come 
apart, but when they don't one may still say that an action violated a moral 
demand and that that the agent has a nasty character. To see this, consider 
an occasion when someone deliberately causes injury to another person. 
For this action to be 'objectively' describable as cruel, it is not necessary 
that a cruel person has done it. We can allow that people who are 
normally models of blamelessness can sometimes act wrongly. (Of course, 
if it happens too often, then the stipulation that the agent is 'not cruel' is 
undermined.) And the reason why an otherwise kind person can be 
blamed for an act of cruelty is simply that he, by so doing, has done 
something wrong; he has violated a moral obligation. Blame is linked to 
the violation of moral obligations, so that there need not be any stable link 
to a flaw in character.8 
This shows that my stipulation that Mason is a 'singularly inconsiderate 
character' is quite inessential to Mason's blameworthiness on this occasion. 
There is no incoherence in the idea that Mason might in fact be a rather 
normal human being, with customary foibles, strengths and weaknesses. 
But say 1 go and confront him and he is immediately horrified at what he 
has done. 'I am so sorry old chap', he says, 'I can't believe that 1 didn't 
even think about that. I'll immediately make arrangements to have that 
unsightly piece of tin moved out of your way'. 
In such a case, it would seem harsh of me to go on feeling indignant 
toward Mason. However, I don't think that this suggests that Mason is not 
blameworthy. His own reaction indicates that he has done something 
wrong, although not intentionally so. Furthermore, although his response 
to what happened is ethically admirable (and this may go some way to 
8 Sec Wallace 1998. p. 122. 
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placating me), it does not change the fact that he should have considered me 
in the first place. Indeed the manner in which my attitude is mollified 
seems to be closer to accepting his apology and thinking well of him for 
rectifYing the situation, than thinking that I was unwarranted in my 
indignation.9 Compare Strawson (1982): 
To ask to be forgiven is in part to acknowledge that the attitude 
displayed in our actions was as such as might be properly resented, and 
to repudiate that attitude for the future; and to forgive is to accept the 
repudiation and to foreswear the resentment. (p. 63) 
Thus, it seems to me that my softening my attitude to Mason does not 
show that I never blamed him in the first place and nor does it show that 
he is not blameworthy. Although his ignorance modifies the quality of will 
attributable to him so that he did not intentionally wrong me, this 
alteration does not undermine the fact that a negligent quality of will is 
also morally objectionable. 
The temptation to think that the fact that Mason 'just did not think 
about it', and his willingness to make amends undermines the legitimacy 
of my previous indignation emerges from the conception of blame 
discussed in the last chapter. 10 For Mason's response to his fault does show 
that he is not really an inconsiderate man, and that he tries to respect his 
neighbours; however, it would only show that my indignation was unfair if 
we thought I felt indignant toward him for being an inconsiderate man. 
More specifically, if we thought that my judgement that he was 
blameworthy was a judgement about the propriety of attributing a certain 
flaw of character. However, as we have seen with the example of cruelty, 
there is considerable leeway between someone's acting cruelly on occasion, 
and his actually being a cruel person; but this does not mean that he is not 
9 On a similar note Adams {I 985) remarks: 'In repentance you repudiate this opposition, not as an evil existing 
outside the inner circle of your selfhood, but as your own; and you reproach yourself for it' (p. 16 ). 
10 See SeClion 3.1. 
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to blame for his spontaneous and rare acts of cruelty. Similarly, someone 
may be to blame for acts of selfishness or inconsiderateness irrespective of 
whether they conform to a habitual pattern of behaviour. 
Let us explore this a little further. I have claimed that the question 
relevant to moral blame is whether the offender has actually done 
something wrong; more specifically, has violated a moral obligation. 
Therefore. it is not in fact relevant to a person's blameworthiness. that he 
be habitually prone to such shortcomings-although this may have a 
bearing on the force of the reactive emotion. (A willingness to accept 
'responsibility' and to make amends will tend to mitigate the force of the 
blame.) On the other hand, it seems to me that having a 'vice of 
ignorance' provides a deep explanation of why the Tracing Principle will 
be hopeless in explaining the apparent culpability of selfish and 
inconsiderate actions. For if someone displays certain tendencies to see 
things in ways that entail the subordination of others' interests-that is, he 
has the vice-and, the vice is one of having a blind spot, and the agent is 
typically unaware that his way of thinking has this consequence. then his 
moral failures of negligence are directly attributable to a trait of character, 
one which he does not even know he has. But this means that the Tracing 
Principle cannot explain his (purportedly) culpable actions and omissions, 
for these occasions of deficient consideration are the upshot of a 
systematically distorted pattern of thought. (It is not that the agent does 
not accept the obligation: it is just that having the vice means that he is 
very bad at meeting it.) For one thing, it is unlikely that we are ultimately 
responsible for the creation of our own characters. I I For another. even if 
we were able to affect our characters to some considerable extent, since a 
person with the vice is often unaware that he has it. there is, in his rr 'nd, 
11 See G. Strawson (1994, pp. 5-24, especially, p. 5-7), 
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no moral fault to take responsibility for-whatever indirect control we have 
over our own characters is thereby rendered irrelevant. 
So in these cases, having a certain vice of ignorance explains why the 
agent fails to fulfil his duties. However, he is not to blame for having the 
vice: rather, he is to blame because he has done wrong by not doing what 
he should he and discharging his duties. This point-that having the vice is 
not necessary for blame-is illuminated in the following example from the 
bible. Consider this passage from Numbers (20: 1-12; King James Bible; 
the italics are mine): 
I. Then came the children of Israel, even the whole congregation, into 
the desert of Zin in the first month ... 2. And there was no water for the 
congregation: and they gathered themselves together against Moses 
and Aaron. 3. And the people chode with Moses, and spake, saying, 
Would God that we had died, when our brethren died before the Lord! 
4. And why have ye brought up the congregation of the Lord into this 
wilderness, that we and our cattle should die there? 5. And wherefore 
have ye made us come up out of Egypt, to bring us into this evil place 
.. . 6. And Moses and Aaron went from the presence of the assembly 
unto the door of the tabernacle of the congregation, and they fell upon 
their faces ... 7. And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, 8. Take thou 
rod and gather the assembly together, thou, and Aaron thy brother, 
and speak ye unto the rock before their eyes; and it shall give forth his 
water ... 9. And Moses took the rod from before the Lord, as he 
commanded him. 10. And Moses and Aaron gathered the congregation 
together before the rock, and he said unto them, Hear now, ye rebels; 
must we fetch you water out of this rock? 11. And Moses lifted up his 
hand, and with his rod, he smote the rock twice: and the water came 
out abundantly, and the congregation drank, and their beasts also. 12. 
And the Lord spake unto Moses and Aaron, Because ye believed me 
not, to sanctify me in the eyes of the children of Israel, therefore ye shall not 
bring this congregation into the land I have given them. 
Deuteronomy 32 verse 52 clarifies the nature of Moses' sin: 
52. Because ye trespassed against me among the children of Israel at 
the waters of Meribah-Kadesh, in the wilderness of Zin; because ye 
sanctified me not in the midst of the children of Israel. 
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Let us set aside any questions about culpability for a lack of fa ith, and 
understand the account in terms of someone failing to give proper respect 
and credit when it is required. Yahweh holds Moses to the demand that he 
show Him the proper honour and respect, such that he give Him proper 
credit for bringing forth the waters. Moses failed to do this; that is, he 
fai led to meet the requirement of giving the honour to God. However, he 
did not intentionally take the recognition fo r himself: his fail ing to show 
proper respect was furthest from his mind when he committed the sin. 
However, Yahweh regarded his ignorance as culpable: he should have 
remembered. The issue of whether it is fair for God to have blamed Moses 
is difficult,l2 but for the moment, note that Moses was, as is well known, a 
righteous man, someone who won favour in God's eyes. However, the 
circumstances were such that the children of Israel were complaining 
about being led out of Egypt into a desert land; furthermore, they 
apparently 'blamed' Moses for leading them to this uncongenial setting. 
Thus, it seems that Moses was angry with them, irritated at their 
ingratitude at having been led out of Egypt and constant whinging. It was 
then in anger that he spoke these words: 'Hear now ye rebels, must we 
fetch you water out of th is rock?' 
It is plain that Moses respected God, and did his best to serve Him. 
However in his anger and irritation he failed to pay heed to the fact that it 
was not he who was bringing forth the water but God Himself. But where 
does Moses' fault lie? Once again, it seems that the Tracing Principle is 
hopeless to explain Moses' failure . Even if he had entered into a covenant 
with God (,Honour the Lord thy God!'), it would still be true that there 
could have been any specific maxims of preparation that he could have 
adopted lest he fail in this way. Therefore, to repeat a point from Sectior 
12 I say more about his in Section 4.7. Clearly. nothing CenirallO (he example necessitates the divin ity and 
ultimate justice or God. 
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4.1, this suggests that what is central to caSeS where the Tracing Principle 
won't work is not that the obligation in question is one voluntarily 
acquired, but rather that it be a positive duty, 13 that is, of such a nature that 
it be extended over time, and one in which a person may fail to measure 
up to in multiple different ways: many disparate forms of behaviour-which 
are not of any determinate pattern-may constitute failures in this regard. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that someone may fail to fulfil a positive duty 
simply through a loss of orientation, where this loss of orientation is not due 
to something that the agent has culpably chosen. 
4.3 Positive Duties: Losing Orientation 
In this section, I further explore the possibility of involuntary failures in 
the context of positive duties. I aim to show that even when-in contrast 
with the caSeS of Mason and Moses-there are determinate patterns of 
behaviour that an agent must abide by, it will not necessarily follow that 
his failures will be intelligible in terms of voluntary choices not to adopt 
certain maxims of preparation. 
To see this, consider the following example of a failure to meet a 
positive duty, this time one specified by a practice. The example is the 
case of Regina v. Finney, as provided by J.L. Austin (1970) in A Plea for 
Excuses: 
Prisoner was indicted for the manslaughter of Thomas Watkins. 
The prisoner was an attendant at a lunatic asylum. Being in charge of 
the lunatic, who was bathing, he turned on hot water into the bath, and 
thereby scalded him to death. The facts appeared to be truly set forth 
in the statement of the prisoner before the committing magistrate, as 
follows: 'r had bathed Watkins [the deceased], and had loosed the bath 
out. I intended putting in a clean bath, and asked Watkins if he would 
get out. At this time my attention was drawn to the next bath by the new 
attendant, who was asking me a question; and my attention was taken 
13 See Section 3.2.3. 
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from the bath where Watkins was. I put my hand down to turn water on 
in the bath where Watkins was. I did not intend to turn the hot water, 
and I made a mistake in the tap. I did not know what I had done until I 
heard Thomas Watkins shout out; and I did not find my mistake out 
until I saw the steam from the water. You cannot get water in this bath 
when they are drawing water at the other bath; but at other times it 
shoots out like a water gun when the other baths are not in use .. .'(p. 
196) 
The verdict was 'not guilty'. This example is important because the 
accused was not acquitted of manslaughter because he was entirely innocent 
of negligence but because 'the lunatic had such possession of his faculties as 
would enable him to understand what was said to him, and to get out of 
the bath'(p. 196). (And perhaps that the degree of culpability did not 
amount to manslaughter-'A culpable mistake, or some degree of culpable 
negligence, causing death, will not support a charge of manslaughter; 
unless the negligence be so gross as to be reckless (Counsel Young's 
speech, p. 196). Presumably this means that he had foreseen the 
probability (or at least possibility) of risk.14) This illustrates that a person 
might fail to properly do his duty, and be liable to blame, without any 
culpable choice on his part. The fact that the prisoner was acquitted of 
manslaughter does not imply that he was not to blame for negligence. 
The point here is that being an attendant in an asylum with incumbent 
duties, one is obliged to be very careful to make sure that one fulfils these 
duties; one must make regular checks and take extra precautions to 
ensure the safety of one's wards. In this respect, being distracted by 
someone asking you a question does not show that one met those duties; 
indeed being so distracted seems to indicate that one was not careful 
enough, and therefore negligent.l5 
14 See Section 2.2 .1 on recklessness. 
15 This suggests that when someone gets off the hook from a charge of negligence , it will he shown that the 
circumstances were such that the agent was prevented from meeling his duties. For example, should the 
prisoner have been distracted by the violent jolt of a bomb blast, he would likely be judged innocent of 
negligence. (Since I have reserved the term 'excuse' for a blame-inhibitor which indicates that an action was 
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A theme I want to emphasise here is that when the duty in question is a 
positive duty, such that there are many things that might constitute 
failures to measure up, the less likely it will be that the failure is traceable 
to culpable choices on the part of the agent.l6 This is evidenced by the 
examples of Mason, Moses, and Austin's prisoner. For in all of these cases, 
due to their obligations being positive duties of 'taking care' to (i) be 
considerate, or (ii) show honour, or (iii) ensure the safety of one's wards, 
there are many different ways in which they might fail. Indeed, we might 
say that circumstances will dictate what meeting this obligation will 
require. As with Austin's prisoner, even when an agent voluntarily acquires 
such a duty and implements maxims of preparation (cf. Herman (1993)) , 
this will not entirely safeguard him against failure. There is no simple 
series of steps one can take to ensure that one measures up. Of course, 
sometimes circumstances will thwart the agent and he will not then be to 
blame, but other times, he will simply miss something, or temporarily 
forget, thereby failing to protect, honour or consider. 17 
To illustrate further, consider Robert Audi's example of the 'happy-go-
lucky couple who unthinkingly fail to provide for their children's future' 
(1991, p. 306)-call them the Turners. Once again, it seems to me that the 
Turners may be resented for their failure, and, again, the failure in 
question is the failure to meet a positive duty. Thus, while it is true that 
parents cannot really fail to know that they have a duty to care for their 
children, they may easily fail to know exactly what might be required of 
'unintentional'. I will therefore speak of an 'excuse' from negligence. Context should make this clear.) 
However, a qualification is in order: the nature or severity of the intervention that prevented him form 
fulfilling his duties is only relevant if he was indeed doing those duties. h also needs to be shown thal agent was 
in the process of carrying them out and that this distracting force caused him to fail (0 fulfi l them (or prevented 
him from doing them) . An 'excuse' for negligence or carelessness should show that the agent was in the process 
of meeting his obligations when the extenuating event occurred, resulting in the agent becoming disoriented 
toward his duties through no culpable failure on his part. 
16 See Section 2.3.3. 
17 The idea of something being foreseeable is invoked in this context. It may be said that if he should have 
foreseen the danger. then he may be (0 blame. Of course, this notion of 'foreseeability' is not necessarily 
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them to fulfil that duty. Let's say that the Turners are a fun-loving couple 
who, when they decide to have children, know that this will require them 
to make some changes in their lifestyle to carry out their parental duties. 
However they only think of the obvious: clothes and schooling and 
whatever else springs to mind. Perhaps it is true that they do not think 
hard enough about what might be required of them, but then it is hard to 
know what this standard of 'due consideration' might be.ls Are they 
required to read Spock's entire chrestomathy on childrearing? In this 
sense, although they are not ignorant of their general duty to look after 
their children, they are ignorant that (perhaps) saving for their children's 
future is, in fact, part of what it would mean to be doing the job properly. 
And although this ignorance may stem from a certain lack of 
assiduousness on their part, this failing is itself an involuntary fault, and 
one that cannot be accounted for by the Tracing Principle. 
In contrast with all these temporally extended and complex positive 
duties, consider an obligation with a very precise specification of what is 
required to meet it, such as the duty to payoff one's debts at an arranged 
time. The agent who acquires this obligation can be left in no doubt as to 
what he must do to meet his duty: he must set whatever mechanisms in 
place to ensure that when the time comes he will be in a position to pay 
his debts. To be sure, he might be failing in his duty even before the 
actual time comes when he cannot pay, but the point is that the steps that 
he should take are relatively straightforward and specifiable. This makes 
this linear type of duty, a good candidate for the Tracing Principle. 
In my opinion, this suggests that the Tracing Principle is effective only 
in cases where it is relatively obvious what the agent needs to do to meet 
his commitments, and the agent is informed of exactly what this might 
connected with any voluntary choices the agent may have made. If he simply didn't foresee the danger, then it 
was not through any choice on his part. 
18 See Adams (1985, p. 19). 
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entail. To this extent, his failure might be due to a culpable choice not to 
do what he should do, a choice not to take 'reasonable precautions'. 
However, when the requirement is a positive duty and sufficiently 
complex, there can be no specific set of procedures that one may adopt: 
there is not any simple end for which to strive. In this circumstance, there 
may be no culpable choice of which to speak, for the reason the agent 
failed to take reasonable care, is that he did not appreciate all the 
demands that were placed on him.I9 
In this respect, Audi's example IS best understood as a failure to 
become properly oriented to the needs of the situation-what is required to 
fulfil the positive duty, while Austin's example is best understood in terms 
of a loss of orientation. Culpability will depend on whether there is some 
condition that prevented the agents' from gaining or maintaining their 
perspective, and on whether what they are required to do is really 
obligatory. 
4.4 Interlude: Drawing the Threads 
Let us pause for a moment to emphasise the themes that have emerged 
from the above examples and to generalise them in one respect. In the 
first example, Mason was ignorant of the fact that by building his house as 
he did, he would be blocking my view. In this respect, Mason was ignorant 
of some fact that he should not have been ignorant of; had he realised 
what he was doing he would not have done it, for he does accept that he 
has an obligation to consider the interests of others. He did what he did 
19 Aud i (199\) ponders whether the couple's culpability (\) depends on any basic acts (such as having chosen 
to 'lavishly entertain friends' (p. 306), or whether it is merely (2) intelligible in terms of 'basic acts': 'For if I am 
criticisably responsible for a state of affairs having occurred which I did not bring about by something that I 
did, there must have been some option I should have taken and did nm' (p. 307). These suggestions are of no 
help to PVC. The problem with the firs t option is that those basic acts will not be culpable unless the agents 
knew that there was something they should be doing instead. The problem with the second is that the 'option 
that one should have taken' will not necessarily be in the agent's purview. For example, Mason should have 
checked [0 see whether he was blocking my view (this is the option he should have taken), but this does not 
explain his culpability because his failure to take this option resulted from his complete lack of thought. 
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inadvertently, but his inadvertence does not excuse because he was 
negligent. Mason's failure is then a failure to meet a natural positive duty 
through a loss of orientation, and moreover, one that he accepts .2o (This is 
under the assumption that he is not really a singularly inconsiderate 
character: if he was, then we might say that he is always disoriented .) 
On the other hand, the prisoner in Austin's example acquired his 
duties by virtue of having Joined' a practice. His failure then amounts to 
failing to fulfil an acquired positive duty; and something similar, may, I 
think, be said of Moses. (Say he entered into a covenant with God: 
'Honour the Lord thy GOd' .21) The prisoner in Austin and Moses (through 
his anger and irritation) both lose their orientation with respect to their 
duties, although it is easier for the prisoner to take precautions because 
his duty is not quite as complex. Finally, the Turners are never properly 
oriented to begin with. 
Furthermore, it should be clear that there is no important difference 
between negligent actions as opposed to omissions; in either case, if what 
he did do-his actions-or what he didn't do-his omissions- display a 
measure of negligence or carelessness, the agent may be morally blamed. 
1. Someone may perform a negligent action because of a want of 'due 
consideration' or a failure to take proper preventative measures. Although 
the agent 'could have thought about it' or he 'could have taken more 
careful measures' these failures do not conform to VM since the agent's 
'choice' not to take those measures is not culpable if it is done in 
ignorance that they were required. The examples of Mason, Moses and 
20 One difference between natural and acqu ired dUlies resides in lhat, when one makes a promise, or signs a 
contract, one knows exactly what the obligation requires . This will make it 'easier' (0 take measures to meet that 
acquired duty. On the other hand, some 'positive' acquired duties are themselves very complex making this 
difference one of degree rather than of kind. 
21 Although we all might have a duty to honour God, whether we recognise it or not, this wil l essentially entail 
a susceptibility to blame. On the o ther hand, if one makes a promise, onc takes it upon oneself to behave in 
certain ways. Some promises may even be linear duties. See Section 3. 
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Austin's prisoner are cases in which an action's being unintentional does 
not undermine the agent's susceptibility to blame because the Ignorance 
that made it unintentional was itself culpable. 
2. By contrast it seems to me that the Turners fail to live up to their duties 
as parents by omission. Indeed they do not do the things that they should 
be doing because they are too busy doing other things that they should 
not be doing. Some omissions are actions, and should be construed on the 
model of a choice not to act in a certain way: these may be called 
'abstentions' (Audi 1991, p. 306). (Someone may be fully aware that a 
certain course is required of her, but abstains from doing what she should. 
In such a circumstance, her omitting to do the right thing is consequent 
on her choosing not to do it.) But not all omissions are actions, for some 
are simply non-performances (p. 306). And these are not connected to 
choices. The Turners culpably omit to perform the actions they should, 
without these failures being dependant on any choices they have made. 
However, what is common to all the examples discussed above is that the 
agents do, in some sense, accept the demand (positive duty) to consider, 
honour, or care and protect, but fail to measure up. I have suggested that 
it is not crucial that the duties be natural as opposed to acquired; what is 
crucial is that they be positive duties, that is, duties of high complexity 
and temporal extension, requiring active effort to fulfil. However, the 
existence of natural duties does open up the possibility of another way in 
which someone may be ignorant, and prima facie , culpably SO.22 For 
someone might just not have realised that he has a certain positive duty. 
22 The importance of the dut), being 'natural' resides in the fact that this duty is never specified. All acquired 
duties arc spe<ified, such thal one could not fail to know that one had the duty. However, although a natural 
dUly binds all mOTal agents, it is something we are supposed to learn through an adequate moral development. 
The possibility I raise in me next section is one where an agent of sufficient moral capacity has 'let one get 
th rough the nef. so to speak. 
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This example is different from the other examples above in that those 
persons presumably realised that they had certain obligations-to sanctifY 
God's name, or look out for the interests of others, to take care of one's 
children, etc. Holmes however does not realise this at all. He has never 
considered the question of whether he might in fact owe his father some 
sort of appreciation or gratitude . But, once again we may say that the 
'meaner domestic vices' have been bred into Holmes such that he has 
acquired certain behavioural tendencies. And, once more, the Tracing 
Principle is hopeless since because we are here dealing with a 'vice of 
ignorance': there can be no culpable choice in ignorance. This means that 
since the vice of ingratitude may involve an unawareness that one is being 
ungrateful, and additionally, the agent does not know that he ought to be 
grateful, it is not conceivable that his moral failure might be traceable to 
preceding failures to take reasonable precautions. But nonetheless, as in 
the case of Holmes, the agent's actions may still manifest the moral quality 
of ingratitude. Holmes' father expects some sort of gratitude and 
recognition, and holds his son to this demand. We may plausibly imagine 
him to feel resentful or indignation towards his son. 
It seems compatible with a person's failing to know that he has a duty of 
'gratitude' that he does realise that he has a duty to respect his father. 
This compatibility resides in the agent's not realising that being grateful is 
one way of showing respect. Holmes does not realise that he ought to 
show gratitude, although he does know that other forms of disrespect are 
blameworthy. Thus, Holmes will not tend to disobey his father if he 
services (0 you' (p. 17g)--argues that it is not dear that th ese are duties at all, unl ess the benefactor has a right 
to expect a return. 'And he could on ly acquire a right jf there was some implied promise' (p. 179) 
This can't be right if it rests on the premise that an 'implied promise' is required for the acquisition of a duty. 
For (his wou ld entirel)' li mit the sphere of obligation [Q volu ntarily acquired cOntracts. This is unacceptable 
since it would also eliminate obligations again st cruelty and non maleficence. Williams's comments likely stem 
from his general scepticism about morality construed as a system of obligalion. See Williams (1985), especially. 
Chapter 10. Compare Taylor (1989): '''Morality'', of course, can be an often is defined purely in term s of our 
respect for others (p. 14).' 
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forbids him from a certain course; and neither will he simply shrug off or 
disregard any formal request his father might make ('Please don't leave 
the car unlocked'). However, he is also ungrateful because he has come to 
expect things, almost as though he believes that he is entitled to receive 
them. But he has never thought this through; he has become disposed to 
behaving ungratefully, without ever thinking that gratitude is required of 
him. 
So, in the case of Holmes, there are two things of which he is ignorant. 
He is ignorant that his actions constitute a failure to show proper 
gratitude. And he is ignorant that he actually has any duty of gratitude. 
His ignorance of the latter ensures that he will never know when he is 
'failing' or 'complying' with this requirement. I don't mean to suggest that 
a fully articulated conception of one's duties is necessary for compliance 
with a moral obligation; rather a more rudimentary sense in which one 
does tend to choose things for appropriate reasons (cf. Wallace 1998, p. 
132) seems to be compatible with someone's fulfilling a demand. On the 
other hand, I contend that a complete unawareness of such requirements 
and a disposition to do things that reflect a lack of compliance is enough 
for a failure to comply. It is not necessary for the violation of a duty of 
gratitude or respect that one actually know that one has this duty. 
However, in the case of a duty of respect, it is unlikely that a normal agent 
of' sufficient moral development could entirely fail to know that this is 
required of him. I thereby understand the Holmes example in terms of 
Holmes' knowing that he has some duty to respect but not knowing that 
he has a duty of gratitude, because being grateful is just one way of 
showing respect, one way that is, which he fails to know. 
This example illustrates that we expect of each other a certain level of 
ethical sensitivity, a certain awareness of the nuances of interpersonal 
relationships and accompanying norms of respect and consideration, and 
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what constitutes compliance and violation of these,25 For these general 
principles-to respect others, or be grateful to one's benefactors-may be 
violated in many different ways, which will be determined by a web of 
cultural practices generated by an embedding in a community, In this 
sense, the analogy with role-requirements is tight: duties of respect arise 
not only out of our membership in a moral community, but are realised in 
different form according to more specific social communities, 
To illustrate, recall the example of Cooper the traveller in Chapter 2, 
Cooper's ignorance resided in her ignorance of a particular instantiation 
of the duty to respect, namely that a certain posture and manner of 
speech was regarded by that community has a violation of the 
requirement. However assuming that she was not negligent, she seems to 
be blameless for her error since it could not be reasonably expected of her 
to know that this behaviour would constitute a violation of the duty of 
respect. Or to take another example, consider another sub-duty of the 
duty of mutual respect, the requirement to respect another's privacy, 
bearing in mind that in certain islands of Samoa, people live in houses 
without any walls dividing them, Now, imagine that an islander arrives in 
the West, and he seems to display no regard for anyone's privacy at all. He 
continually pokes his head into your house, and turns up late at night in 
your garden. It would seem that if this foreigner were from a land in 
which there was no duty of privacy (or perhaps more accurately, a duty of 
privacy was realised in very different ways), then he would not be to blame 
for his failures, And this is simply because we cannot reasonably hold him 
to an obligation that he has not had a chance to learn. However, we can 
blame Holmes because he is-by assumption-a fully-fledged member of the 
moral community. Failures of positive duties of respect are relative to a 
25 It is plausible (hat in a 'nash of· self·consciou sness' Holmes may realise that he has been behaving 
ungratefully, and that he has never thought about the need for gratitude. In this respeCl he willl'calise tha t he 
has not displayed the appropriate level of ethical sensi tivil)'. 
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community, such that (fully fledged) participant members are expected to 
have a grasp of these rules of conduct. We are expected to know what our 
(sub)duties are, and that certain acts are regarded as violations of these 
duties. 'Don't look away when I am talking to you; that's very rude.' 'Don't 
look at your elders' straight on: show some respect.' These forms of 
behaviour are taken to reflect a certain blameworthy' quality of will'. 
This condition, that the agent must be the right kind of being-
including having a certain social history-for moral judgement is further 
illustrated by the notion of partial exemptions (cl: Wallace 1998, p. 179). 
Consider one more reformulation of the Mason example: Say I go and 
confront Mason and, as before, he is horrified at what he has done. 'I am 
so sorry old chap, he says, 'I can't believe that I didn't even think about 
that. It's just that so much has been going on: we've had some family 
troubles of late, and with the stress with the whole building process and 
all, I really haven't been myself. You won't hold it against me will you?' 
The point here is that Mason is not citing some condition to show that 
he is not accountable for building the house as he did, because he did it 
inadvertently. He accepts that he should have thought about things more 
carefully. However, he tries to show that circumstances being as they are, 
his ability to uphold various moral obligations have been impaired by the 
extreme stress. This is to say that he asks that I not resent him for his 
failure to comply with a moral demand, because he was during this time 
not a fully responsible agent. In fact, Wallace (1998) makes this very point: 
The effectiveness of this kind of mitigating condition [stress) would 
presumably be selective, however: the stressed-out agent may not be 
fully responsible for acts of rudeness, inconsideration or minor cruelty, 
but stress alone would not seem to mitigate the agent's moral 
responsibility for, say, elaborately plotting and executing the employer 
who fired her (p. 179). 
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The requirements for proper respect and consideration are binding on all 
agents who are fully functional members of the moral community. And 
failures of these positive duties are not in any interesting sense exhausted 
by what the agent chooses to bring about. 
4.6 Methodological Interlude 
Where are we in the argument? According to PB, an agent is blameworthy 
for x only if he has violated a moral obligation in x-ing. Furthermore, by 
VM, if someone has violated a moral obligation in x-ing then he 
voluntarily consented to doing something morally bad (i.e. x), or his 
violating an obligation is traceable to some earlier culpable choice. In the 
previous section, I presented cases where agents failed to fulfil their 
duties, without their failures being traceable to voluntary choices. 
Furthermore, the reactive attitudes which may be elicited in these cases 
are moral reactive attitudes because they are explained by beliefs about the 
violation of moral requirements. If this is correct then these agents are 
blamed for their failures. This means that the only response left to the 
defender of voluntary consent is to say that the blame in these cases is not 
appropriate blame, but is somehow unfair. Recall that on the conception 
of blame that I am working with: 
(N*) A is morally blameworthy for x just in case it is fair to blame A for 
x . 
The dilemma we have reached is whether to say that the agent 
unintentionally violated a moral obligation (or more accurately, 
unintentionally failed to fulfil his duties), or to say that the blame 
judgements and reactions III these cases are unwarranted and our 
intuitions must be revised to accord with the Principle of Voluntary 
Consent. These agents are not blameworthy, because they haven't done 
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anything wrong, because one can only do something wrong voluntarily'. 
Thus, if my arguments are correct, we have reached a point where our 
moral intuitions do not coincide with the normative principle PVC·: the 
question is whether to maintain VM or revise our moral intuitions. 
This impasse raises important questions about how our normative 
moral principles are generated, and how to go about refining and 
theorising about them. In his discussion of the method of seeking a 
'reflective equilibrium' Rawls writes: 
This state [of reflective equilibrium] is reached when after a person has 
weighed various proposed conceptions and has either revised his 
judgements to accord with one of them, or held fast to h is considered 
convictions (1972, pp. 48). 
Rawls' idea is to examine our considered judgements about different cases 
and to 'explore patterns in these judgements and to seek to find general 
principles that systematise and illuminate them' (Fischer and Ravizza 
1998, pp. 10-11). The process is dialectical in that we draw out principles 
from consideration of our moral intuitions from a wide number of cases, 
in turn subjecting these principles to further moral scrutiny. This is to say 
that unless one has independent reasons to opt for a thoroughgoing 
revisionism, it should be plain that our normative principles ought to 
coincide with our moral intuitions concerning particular cases insofar as 
possible. 
To this extent it is possible that our normative principles are based on 
mistakes derived from skews in the sample of cases we are considering, or 
from misunderstanding the nature of the particular examples. For 
example, as discussed in Chapter I, the Principle of Alternative 
Possibilities (PAP) presents itself as a generalisation from a wide number 
of cases (involving (e.g.) coercion, constraint and duress) in which the 
agent seems to be excused from blame because he lacks the ability to do 
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otherwise. However, if Frankfurt, Strawson and Wallace are right, then 
PAP is essentially due to a confusion generated by a failure to pay proper 
attention to the actual details of the case. It is not in fact relevant that the 
agent could not do otherwise, but relevant that the agent wanted to will as 
he did will (Frankfurt), violated the demand for good will (Strawson), or 
chose to do something wrong (Wallace). 
In the sections that follow, I suggest that something similar is true of 
PVC. To show this, I need not only point to cases that do not coincide with 
these principles (as I have done above), but also to diagnose why these 
conclusions have seemed attractive. We should hope to achieve an 
explanation for the errors that resulted in these mistaken normative 
principles.26 
4.7 Against Revision 
I am inclined to think that PVC is faulty because it is a generalisation from 
a skewed set of samples. To set the stage, consider that a statement to the 
effect that someone has failed to do his duties properly does not 
immediately evoke any connotations of a choice to do wrong. It seems to 
convey primarily a meaning of inactivity, or failing to 'measure up', a 
'missing of the mark' .27 It is quite different when we say that someone has 
violated a moral obligation: this connotes activity, the idea of choice, or of 
an intentional wrongdoing. 
Similarly the notion of negligence, insofar as it denotes moral faults of 
'failures to take reasonable precautions against harm' (Hart 1968, p. 258), 
conveys the idea of 'not attending to one's duties', where it would seem 
somewhat artificial to insist that all such instances of a lack of attention are 
26 Wallace's entire book, Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments (1998) is an excellent example of this 
method of diagnosing the temptation for the faulty generalisation he sees inhering in Incompalibilisl views on 
moral responsibility. 
27 Interestingly enough, the Creek word for 'sin' conveys precisely this meaning: a 'missing of the mark', 
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somehow traceable to one's culpable choices. We think that the Turners 
were negligent and should have thought about saving for their children: 
we do not think that they (culpably) chose to do (or not do) things that 
may lead to their violating their parental duties. But all this is perhaps 
inconclusive. However, there is a very telling reason for thinking that the 
violation of some moral obligations does not require any measure of 
voluntary consent. 
Once we consider the nature of the obligations of (e.g.) consideration 
or respect, it seems very odd to think that these obligations can only be 
violated intentionally. In fact, it seems strange to think that they can be 
violated intentionally. Consider that if someone went out of his way to be 
inconsiderate, trying to be as inconsiderate as possible, then he could 
(paradoxically) probably not be regarded as inconsiderate. Deliberate 
violations such that one tried to impinge on the interests of others 
correspond more to obligations against maleficence or spitefulness, than 
inconsiderateness or disrespect. The only exception here is that someone 
might think that he ought not to respect someone else's interests. He may 
then shrug off a duty of consideration, acting in ways that he knew 
contravened the duty, without making an active effort to be inconsiderate. 
In this case we might still refer to his actions as selfish or inconsiderate, 
despite his explicit rejection of the duty. However, this is probably quite 
rare; suffice to say that most violations of obligations of inconsideration or 
respect are cases of negligence. But, as I have shown above, one is very 
often negligent not because one culpably failed to take reasonable 
precautions, but because one simply failed to appreciate the demands of 
the situation. But in these cases, when an agent did not realise that he was 
failing in a duty of consideration, it seems impossible to connect this 
failure to any voluntary and culpable choices on his part. 
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These comments pertain to natural positive duties; these are very 
general duties that we acquire simply through embedding in a moral 
community. But as already remarked, there are other duties which we 
acquire in virtue of a particular station in society, or as a result of 
occupying a formal oflice. And with respect to these duties, it is even 
odder to think that some degree of culpable intention is required to 
violate them. A failure as a parent, officer, or sentry, will almost invariably 
be as a result of some failure to appreciate the situation properly. This 
may very well indicate negligence, but not always, even usually, of the type 
that will be traceable to choices to disregard the requirements of duty. In 
fact, the kinds of examples I have provided can be easily multiplied.28 
For these reasons then, I suggest that the PVC· is in fact counter-
intuitive as a principle pertaining to the type of moral obligation I termed 
a positive duty, that is, an obligation characterised by the high level of 
care required to meet it over an extended period of time. Furthermore, 
taking the option of revising our practices to conform to PVC*-saying that 
agent's are not to blame in these cases-has another unappealing 
consequence. It would commit us to admitting that someone was blameless 
because his vice of (e.g.) selfishness or inconsiderateness prevented him 
from doing his duty. 
Of course, I have claimed that a person does not actually need to have a 
vice of ignorance in order to be blamed for failing to fulfil his duties. And 
furthermore, although we are inclined to blame someone more if he 
28 I'll perhaps mention one more example here: consider Sm ith's (1983) example of the doctor who treated an 
infant's respiratory distress with high concentrations o f oxygen, thereby causing severe eye-damage. This is a 
case of culpable ignorance because the doctor should have known better; he should have read the latest 
medical journal that published a study indicating the dangers of this form of treatment. Once again, the 
doctor's failure to rcad the journal, although rulpabJe is not necessarily traceable to any choice he has made. 
though il is possible to describe the case so that this is so: say his nurse lells him the journal has just arrived. 
but he elects to play golf instead (cf. Smith 1983, p. 547) . On the other hand. it could just be that he failed to 
fulfil his duty to keep up with the latest medical news because he forgot, was too busy, or whatever. In these 
circumstances he will. I think, be culpable because he failed to lake reasonable precautions against harm; 
though not to say that he chose. or intended to do this . His failures may simply be the result of a long 
succession of non -performances, where these are due to forgetfulness and carelessness on his part. 
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displays these habitual tendencies, this is not because he has the Vlce-
though we might appraise him for that too-but because not having the 
vice usually entails an atti tude of repen tance and an eagerness to (try to) 
repudiate this behaviour for the future. By contrast someone who is really 
selfish or inconsiderate is more likely to justilY his behaviour as something 
he is entitled to, although this is well after the fact. 
Indeed, when the agent is especially selfish or inconsiderate, this vice-
or tendency to see certain considerations for action and to not see others-
actually explains why he loses his orientation and fails the requirement. 
Or perhaps more accurately, he is always slightly disorientated with 
respect to how he stands in relation to his duties. But if we understand an 
excuse as a condition which renders an action unintentional, then it would 
seem that whatever causes an agent to be ignorant (and so act 
unintentionally) is the explanation of why he is not culpable. For example, 
let's say that Radley buys his new boss chicken for lunch, because his 
colleague told him that she loved chicken, but she is in fact allergic to 
chicken. In this circumstance Radley is blameless because he was tricked. 
His ignorance inhibits blame because it was not culpable: he did the right 
thing, but was unfortunate enough to be tricked by his mischievous (or 
spiteful) colleague. Thus the fact that Radley was tricked is the 
explanation of why he is blameless: why his ignorance is not culpable. 
But this would seem to imply that when it is a vice that actually causes 
the agent to fail in his duties-his thought-patterns are systematically 
distorted-then his vice is the reason why he failed in his duty. But this 
transforms his vice into an explanation of why his ignorance is not culpable . 
But this surely commits us to the following rather odd statements: 
'Why did Mason build his house as he did?' 'Oh he never thought about 
it really'. 'Why didn't he think about it?' 'Because he is so inconsiderate 
that he never takes anyone else into account'. 
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'Holmes, why have you behaved so ungratefully to your father?' I just, 
well, came to expect things from him. I never thought I might owe him 
anything'. 'But why didn't you realise this?' 'Well, I am rather an 
ungrateful teenager, as teenagers' are prone to be.' 
But these expressions function as indictments, and not excuses! Granted, 
they may be indictments on the person's character, which may something 
different from blaming him for a certain action, but nonetheless it seems 
very odd indeed to think that a vice of ignorance could get someone off 
the hook for his negligence or carelessness. They are not of the right kind 
to exempt an agent from blame, because it would seem that we have an 
obligation to eliminate or at least take precautions against influences that 
might cause us to fail in our duties. For example, epilepsy poses a threat 
to the achievement of certain tasks, such as (e.g.) piloting an aircraft. 
Therefore, a pilot has a duty to monitor her health in order to ensure that 
she does not have an epileptic seizure when in control of that aircraft. 
Analogously, it seems that a moral agent would have a duty to ensure that 
he did not act in ways that systematically impinged on the interests of 
others. Therefore, a person who habitually violated a moral obligation 
because of a distortion in his character would seem to acquire a similar 
duty to ensure that this flaw in him was corrected, such that he could 
properly fulfil his duties. However, with regard to a 'vice of ignorance' the 
agent might not even be aware that he has this flaw in this thinking and be 
unaware that he is systematically impinging on the interests of others. 
However, this would not alter the fact that he does have this duty: it would 
simply mean that he has a duty of which he does not know. To think that 
someone could escape the bounds of duty because of his own failures to 
know what is required of him-his own neglect-is very counter-intuitive 
indeed. 
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Something similar can, I think, be said on occasions where the agent is 
not really a vicious character but loses his orientation temporarily. For 
example, Moses lost his orientation because he was angry and irritated. 
'Why Moses, did you fail to give proper credit to God? ' 'Because I was 
so angry and irritated and felt slightly foolish after leading the 
Israelites into the wilderness without water.' 
Once again, these factors do not really seem to be of the right kind to 
exculpate someone from blame for failing to do his duty . We should 
attempt to guard against those responses that might prevent us from 
exercising proper care. A failure to control these responses will not 
entirely inhibit blame, although it may demonstrate that the agent did not 
intentionally do wrong. 
In contrast with the above, there are other 'pleas' that might very well 
exculpate someone from a charge of negligence. In Austin's example, the 
prisoner claimed that his 'attention was drawn to the next bath by the new 
attendant' , who was asking him a question (1970, p. 196). T his seems to be 
a much better candidate for getting him off the hook from blame, but 
whether or not it is accepted depends on the circumstances of the 
situation. If a person were (say) in control of a large passenger aircraft, 
then such an excuse would not be accepted. But a bomb-blast in the cabin 
would be. Therefore, the success of an 'excuse' from negligence will 
depend on the requirements of station and what level of care or diligence 
is demanded in that context. More generally, it will depend on the kind or 
severity of the distraction in proportion to the level of care demanded of 
the situation. However. as noted in Section 4.2. the force of outside 
intervention will only mitigate if it played a direct causal role in the 
agent's failure to do his duty. i.e. it prevented him from taking the care 
that he was already showing. 
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In sum, I suggest that the option of revising our convictions to accord 
with PVC is very unappealing. 
4.8 Diagnosing the Temptation for PVC 
PVC may be seen as generalisation from certain 'prohibitions' (negative 
duties), cases in which the agent would need to display a culpable choice 
in order to violate the obligation. The tendency to use these kinds moral 
prohibitions as paradigmatic instances of blame is intelligible in that they 
really do comprise some of our most earnest and deep-seated moral 
convictions. However, by shifting focus onto the occasions where we fail 
simply by not doing what we should because we lack some knowledge, it 
becomes clear that blame is also appropriate for failing to meet these 
expectations. Indeed, fulfilling these positive duties requires active choice 
on our part. I explain this in more detail below. 
I suggest that there is a relatively sharp distinction between types of 
moral obligations in relation to the notion of voluntary consent. A 
measure of culpable intention is required to violate duties not to be cruel, 
or not to inflict injury. For when an agent can be shown to have 
involuntarily brought about these results, the presumption that he was 
cruel, or set about to injure, will be defeated. He will therefore not be held 
responsible for violating that type of obligation. If his causing injury was 
unintentional but negligent, then he may still be guilty, but this will not be 
for (e.g.) cruelty, but for violating a moral obligation of a different sort. 
For then it may be shown that he did not properly comply with the duty 
not to harm others in the course of his ordinary pursuits, because he did 
not show the measures of care required of a reasonable person. However, 
I have argued at length that this measure of care cannot always be traced 
to any culpable choices on the part of the agent. We expect of each other 
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an ethical sensitivity, a certain level of moral competence that is not 
essentially tied to what we choose to bring about. Blame is the proper 
response to this kind of failure, because it involves non-compliance with a 
moral duty.29 
Furthermore, properly understanding the relation between obligations 
and voluntary consent, allows us to see why the Quality of Choice theory 
does provide a plausible account of all the most commonly recognised 
excuses. To recall, Wallace argues that all the excusing conditions may be 
understood as defeating the presumption that an agent has intentionally 
performed the wrong action: (I) If A is excused from x-ing (where x is any 
morally bad act), then the excuse shows that A did not intentionally do x. 
Furthermore, Wallace invokes VM to explain why this lack of intention 
should undermine the appropriateness of blame. His thought is that 
without a culpable choice, there can be no moral violation, and without a 
moral violation, there is no blame due. However, if I have successfully 
shown that PVC· cannot be sustained, then I have undermined VM, since 
PB is an analytic truth. But this is not to say that VM cannot do the proper 
work in the context of the 'most commonly recognised excuses'. For all 
these excuses do indeed show that the agent did not express any culpable 
quality of choice. However, of course, it does not follow from this that (2) 
if A did not intentionally do x (the morally bad act), then A is necessarily 
excused from blame. This would only follow if moral obligations were 
exclusively tied to choices (as Wallace thinks) . But though a lack of 
Improper intention is necessary for a successful excuse it may not be 
sufficient: for some obligations do not require a degree of improper 
intention. Showing that the agent did not choose culpably will get him off 
the hook for violating a moral prohibition against (e.g.) being malicious, 
but it may not do so for requirements to respect and consideration. 
29 In this I echo some of Adams remarks. albeit in a weaker form (p. 27). 
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The asymmetry between types of moral obligations with respect to 
intention means that 'excuses'-understood as factors mitigating blame-
will function very differently in the context of a charge of negligence or 
carelessness (or a selfish or inconsiderate action-these are just a subset of 
the former two). They will actually show that the agent chose correctly. 
That is, such an 'excuse' will show that the agent made a proper effort to 
fulfil his duties but was thwarted by the intervention of an outside force, or 
made some other blameless error. As already noted, circumstances will 
dictate whether this excuse will be accepted, for the degree of care or 
diligence demanded will be determined by the particular context. 
As it seems to me, this idea fits neatly with Strawson's Quality of Will 
Theory that treats the demand for good will or proper regard as 
fundamental. As noted in Chapter 1, Strawson's account allows that one 
could to violate a requirement for good will or proper regard by 
unintentionally displaying an objectionable quality of will. What is of 
importance is only whether or not the agent did display an attitude that was 
expressive of ill will. Many excuses will show that the agent did not intend 
to do wrong, but this is only one way of showing that the agent accepted 
the demand for proper respect. As indicated above, when it is 
demonstrated that the agent is not guilty of negligence, it will be because 
he has met the demand for proper regard. An 'excuse' must show that the 
agent did fail to meet the demand for good will simpliciter. 
Of course, this re-opens the difficulty that Wallace identified, that the 
demand for proper regard is too broad-including as it does, affection, 
indifference and so on-to isolate the sphere of moral responsibility. 
Wallace departs from this more generic demand for 'proper regard' and 
emphasises choice because he wants (understandably) to capture what is 
distinctive about moral responsibility. He is right in thinking that we are 
not usually morally blamed for being indifferent or failing to reciprocate 
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love. But the narrowmg of the class can be achieved in another way, 
without placing all the emphasis on the agent's culpable choices. 
I suggest that we can follow Wallace in saying that the qualities of will 
which are pertinent to moral blame are indeed those that bear on the 
question of whether or not a moral obligation has been violated. In this 
respect, excuses undermine blame by showing that the agent did not 
violate a moral obligation. This implies that Strawson's notion of good will 
or proper regard must be interpreted to encompass only the sphere of 
moral obligation. 
However, we should resist the inference from PB-moral blame is due 
when someone has violated a moral obligation-to VM, that a moral 
obligation can only be violated through an exercise of voluntary consent. 
We can do this by acknowledging that the content of the moral obligation will 
specify its own rules concerning the kinds of performances or choices that 
will constitute failures and compliances. For example, obligations on 
murder and on cheating, and cruelty do this, being conceptually 
structured to track the agent's choices. On the other hand, obligations of 
consideration and respect include within themselves a requirement not to 
be negligent, where this does not necessarily involve any choice on the 
part of the agent. And something similar is true of the multitudes of 
different positive duties generated by role-responsibilities: these similarly 
specify the duties included in that office. The requirement is simply to 
keep a look out, and that is exactly what must be done; the agent must be 
active about maintaining his orientation with respect to the interests of 
others, and is blameworthy to the extent that he loses this orientation 
(assuming, of course, that he is not to be excused for having lost 
orientation). In fact, Wallace comes close to recognising this point when 
he writes: 
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This reflects the reasonable view that it is anyway much easier to 
comply with the moral prohibition on murder, than with the 
obligations on kindness or consideration (1998, p. 180). 
In summary, I suggest that the Quality of Choice theory is successful as an 
account of the (most commonly recognised) excuses not because VM is 
true-and that choice is required for a moral wrong- but rather that the 
common excuses pertain to a set of moral obligations that do share a 
feature of improper intention. By rejecting VM however, we may say that 
if then agent gets off the hook, then he will not have done anything 
wrong. But his not having done anything wrong will not be determined by 
whether he has voluntary consented to his action, but whether he has-
whatever this may entail-simply, measured up, or fulfilled his duty. With 
the class of 'commonly recognised excuses', this will imply that he didn't 
choose to do anything morally bad; on the other hand, measuring up to 
other obligations require not only that he did not choose to do wrong, but 
that he chose to do good, that is, was active in fulfilling his duty. For the 
class of obligations requiring improper intention VM is true: If A did not 
choose culpably, then A did not do anything wrong. However, for another 
class of obligation, this will be false: the lack of a culpable and voluntary 
choice will not be enough to undermine blame. 
4.9 PVC and Responsiveness to Reason 
In this section I show how the foregoing discussion and proposal in favour 
of rejecting PVC nonetheless allows the preservation of Wallace's 
contention that moral obligations regulate states responsive to reasons . 
This argument was briefly presented in Section 1. 7 .2. 
Wallace claims that the reason why moral obligations are centred on 
choices is that choice is directly responsive to reasons, such that the stance 
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of holding someone to a moral obligation effectively includes a 
commitment to motivate the agent toward compliance with the relevant 
moral obligation. He writes: 
... moral obligations can only be focussed on phenomena that are 
susceptible to being influenced directly by reasons (1998, p. 131). 
And furthermore, 
... we make choices precisely on the basis of reasons we grasp and 
accept; it is only through the mediation of our choices that the reasons 
expressed in moral principles may influence either our emotions or 
feelings or the bodily movements we make. This means that one can be 
said to have complied with a moral obligation only when there is 
present a relevant quality of choice ... Similarly, one cannot be said to 
have violated a moral obligation in the absence of a relevant quality of 
choice (p. 132). 
In my opinion, it does not follow from the fact that moral obligations are 
focussed on phenomena susceptible to direct influence by reasons, that 
'one cannot be said to have violated a moral obligation in the absence of a 
relevant quality of choice'. The claims that (I) moral obligation must be 
focussed on states responsive to reason, and (2) VM, are logically 
independent.3o 
However, the stance of holding someone morally responsible might 
include a commitment toward motivating the agent towards compliance 
even ifVM is false, because the stance of holding someone responsible for 
(e .g.) failing to show proper respect can motivate him to comply with this 
obligation. But, this will proceed simply by attempting to influence the 
choices he makes in the future , through providing new reasons and 
justifications to motivate him toward compliance. Holding a person 
morally responsible for a violation of disrespect, involving as it does a 
commitment to justifying the demands to which one holds that person, 
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may therefore serve the dual purposes of expressing (backward-looking) 
indignation at his missing of the mark, and the forward looking 
therapeutic aim of encouraging him toward greater care. 
This completes my arguments against PVC; before concluding however, 
I want to make a brief attempt to allay the concern that rejecting voluntary 
consent will entail a preponderance of blame. 
4.10 Blame: Keeping Perspective 
A proponent of voluntary consent may fear that once we have admitted 
that someone may violate a moraJ requirement involuntarily, it will follow 
that persons are to blame for all sorts of things, many of which they really 
cannot help doing, having or being. That is, he may think that once we 
abandon the link between choice and blame, there will be no useful 
criteria to use to demarcate the sphere of things for which we are 
potentially blameworthy. He will, understandably, fear that blame will 
rapidly multiply into endemic proportions, with the result that that we 
might be blamed for thinking certain things, for having certain desires, 
and emotions, and for, more generally, not being moral saints. This 
concern may however be brought into proper perspective. 
I . As I have already noted, the content of moral obligations differ with 
regard to their criteria of success. And furthermore, PVC is correct with 
respect to moral prohibitions or negative duties. T his is because VM is 
correct with regard to negative duties: one cannot violate a moral 
prohibition without voluntarily choosing to do so. But this is not because 
the violation of any obligation requires a measure of culpable choice, but 
because there are a class of moral prohibitions conceptually tied to 
30 Note that I am not endorsing the view the obligatiOns can only be centred on states directly responsive to 
reasons. I am merely noting that the position I am advocating allows us to preserve this thesis. 
95 
~ 
II 
i 
Involuntary Action, Consideration and Blame Chapter 4 
choices.31 However, the Principle of Voluntary Consent (in its more 
general formulation, PVC') is false when it comes to an agent's failure to 
fulfil a positive duty, because a failure to attend to a positive duty does not 
conceptually require a quality of culpable choice. It requires only a moral 
carelessness, where this need not entail any prior 'intentional' failures to 
take reasonable precautions. 
However, since in the first place, natural positive duties are duties of 
(e.g.) mutual respect, and gratitude and consideration, these kinds of 
failures are of far less severity-in terms of matters of life and death-than 
many moral injunctions not to steal and cheat and murder. It seems fair to 
say that the moral wrong involved in a failure to pay proper respect is far 
less than that involved in a calculated and deliberate murder. Secondly, 
with respect to 'acquired positive duties', in most cases where the 
consequences of the negligence are very grave, these failures will tend to 
be closely related to the agent's culpable choices. By this I mean that the 
moral wrong will usually be explained by the agent knowingly failing to 
take precautions to ensure that he meets his duties with their 
characteristic connection with the prevention of harm.32 Why is this true? 
Why are many of these grave failures of positive acquired duties related to 
agents' choices? 
It seems simply to be that when someone shoulders a large 
responsibility (to care for a family, or to manage a hospital), he cannot 
help but be aware of many of the primary things required of him in 
meeting that duty. For example, if a person did not know that she was, as 
a parent, required to clothe her children, we would not intelligibly be able 
to regard her as a normally functioning moral agent. Similarly, if a 
31 See Section 2.4.3 
32 Strictly speaking, this kind of failing in which the agem is aware of the dangers of his failing to meet his 
duties is more aptly characterised as recklessness than negligence, because the agent did appreciate the 
potential risks of his fa iling to carry out these duties. However, as Hart (1968) observes, in a lega l context, the 
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surgeon did not know that she was obliged to clean her instruments before 
use, this would raise questions as to whether she was really was a trained 
professional. Or consider Holly Smith's (1983, p.552) example of the 
lifeguard who neglects to learn cardio-pulmonary resuscitation: the reason 
why this 'benighting act' is wrong is that it is obviously par t of her duty as 
a lifeguard to know this technique, and having voluntarily entered into 
this occupation, she cannot plausibly be thought not to know this . 
In these cases then, the agent's negligent omissions or acts will be 
linked by the Tracing Principle to the relatively obvious patterns of 
behaviour required to 'take reasonable precautions against harm'. T o be 
more specific, the most important patterns of behaviour demanded of 
agents in these capacities are specified by the role-requirement, such that 
the agent can hardly fail to aware of them.33 Indeed the most important 
duties acquired voluntarily through joining a practice will be just those 
required for the maintenance of that practice. Therefore, by virtue of 
joining the practice, the agent will always have these kinds of duties in 
mind. If they are 'negligent' (or reckless) about fulfilling these duties, it is 
very likely that they decided to do or not do something that they knew 
might lead to their failures to meet these demands. T o this extent, the 
gravi ty of the moral wrong will be explicable in terms of the agent's 
culpable choices. 
On the other hand, there are things that are also required of agents' in 
these positions, some of which (1) they may fail to know or (2) fail to do 
because of forgetfulness or carelessness. Taking the latter case first, 
consider again Smith's (1983) example of the doctor who caused severe 
eye-damage in an infant through mal-informed treatment. I mentioned 
term negligence is extended to cases where the negligence is intentional, or at least. 'accompanied by a clear 
appreciation of the risks involved' (p. 259). 
) 3 Th is theme-the more determinate the pattern o f bcha\'iour with respect to the duty, the closer the link to 
choice- emerges often. It seems that the more easily specifiable the duty. the more o ften the agen t will tend to 
'have it in mind ', 
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previously, that this case can easily be described so that there is no link to 
any culpable choices. The doctor's fault could simply be due to a long 
series of non-performances; however he does not entirely escape blame, 
though bear in mind that worse consequences do not necessarily entail 
greater wrongs, and thus a higher degree of culpability. For this reason, 
the doctor may only be guilty of failing in his duty to keep informed and 
may not be blameworthy for the infant's blindness. 
I suggested that the cases of 'negligence' in which consequences are 
very dire tends to correspond to occasions of deliberate negligence or 
recklessness. And I think that this is generally true, although, as in the 
example of the doctor, this is not always so. However, it is plain that when 
a practice has legislated a set of requirements key to the maintenance of 
that practice, it will emphasise all the most important preventative 
measures. (Recall the lifeguard example.) But, there may be other 
requirements important to the practice that are not legislated (such that 
the participant may simply not think of them), or which are legislated but 
underplayed. Thus, for example, the negligent doctor may have failed to 
remember to read all the latest medical journals, though he could not 
plausibly have 'forgotten' to attend the annual medical forum. For this 
reason, bad consequences due to negligence will be limited by the duties 
proscribed and emphasised by the practice that the agent has joined. 
Secondly, there are some acquired positive duties that are not formally 
legislated-often because this would be a practical impossibility-and thus 
that the agent may, through some degree of negligence or carelessness, 
simply fail to know. For example, there is no formal set of guidelines to 
which parents must adhere in childrearing. (In view of the varied nature 
of family circumstances, it would be impossible to set forth a list of 
regulations to which a parent must accord.) However, one might say, a 
parent is nonetheless obliged to 'think about it all'. Thus the Turners may 
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fail to know that they should save for their children's futurity, and are 
blameworthy for their omission. Furthermore, although requirements on 
childrearing are not formally proscribed, once again, the things that 
agent's fail to think about will tend to be distal from the nucleus of 
parental obligation. 
These considerations demonstrate that the most serious moral wrongs 
will indeed tend to correspond closely to agents' culpable choices. This 
ought to be of some comfort, at least. 
2. It is not really, I think, counter-intuitive that we are 'to blame' very 
often all the time. Morally assiduous persons always make sure that they 
maintain their orientation, so that they do not fail to fulfil their 
obligations. But, most of us are not moral saints, and many of us are 
sometimes, to greater or lesser extents, selfish, careless, insouciant, and 
ungrateful. By this I mean that we act selfishly, carelessly, insouciantly, 
and ungratefully. And it seems to me that we are blameworthy for all these 
occasions in which we 'miss the mark' in our dealings with others. 
However, a view of blame as a kind of moral accounting may be tacitly 
driving this worry about the preponderance of blame. But this is precisely 
where Wallace's reactive theory may be used to bring things into 
perspective. Being held morally responsible is understood in terms of a 
specific stance of being held to a moral demand. In this sense, actual 
blame is constituted by the reactive emotions such that the agent who is 
blamed is (e.g.) resented, or criticised or punished in a way that serves to 
express the reactive emotions. To this extent, being blamed presupposes 
that there is someone doing the blaming. This being blames is to be 
distinguished from being blameworthy, since this is only to be worthy of 
resentment or indignation (or guilt in the first person case). Therefore, 
for an agent to be blameworthy is for it to be fair for someone to blame 
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him. But this is formulated as a hypothetical in that although it would be 
fair to blame him, there may be no actual judge present who believes that 
he should be blamed; that is, there may be no-one to hold him morally 
responsible. We are only held morally responsible when someone holds us 
to a demand, but this means that although we are often apt candidates for 
being held responsible (not only in the sense that we are morally 
accountable agents but also because we have done things wrong), we are 
not as often held morally responsible. 
Since blaming not thought of a moral accounting, but tied to the actual 
responses and practices of responsible agents, the fear that some moral 
judge with our entire besmirched ledger may call us to account is 
somewhat allayed. Furthermore, to cast something Robert Adams says into 
this context, persons will often not be held to any moral demand, on the 
principle that 'people who live in glass houses should not throw stones' 
(1985, p. 23). We will often merely note the fault of another and at the 
same time think of how often we have failed in a similar manner. It is very 
often none of our business to hold others to moral demands. 
4.11 Conclusion 
In conclusion, the Principle of Voluntary Consent is false. Blame is fair 
when someone has failed to fulfil his duty and failures to fulfil one's duties 
need not be linked to any voluntary and culpable choices. This is because 
positive duties-respect, consideration, and role-acquired duties- do not 
require any culpable intention to fail in, but rather activity and diligence 
to meet. 
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